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1 The State of the Border Report
•	 Well over a billion dollars’ worth of goods cross the  
border each day.
•	 Long and unpredictable wait times at the border ports of 
entry are costing the United States and Mexican econo-
mies many billions of dollars each year.
•	 Trusted traveler and shipper programs (SENTRI, FAST, 
C-TPAT) allow vetted, low-risk individuals and shipments 
expedited passage across the border. Improving these 
programs and significantly expanding enrollment could 
increase border efficiency with minimal investments in 
infrastructure and staffing—all while strengthening security 
by giving border officials more time to focus on unknown 
and potentially dangerous individuals and shipments.
On Competitiveness:
•	 The more the two governments can push key security pro-
cesses away from the border, the better, as an overconcen-
tration of resources at the border (and particularly between 
the ports of entry) has the potential to distract from a more 
strategic distribution of security resources throughout the 
U.S., Mexico and beyond.
•	 While it is difficult to predict future flows of migrants, we 
seem to be at or past a point of diminishing returns in 
terms of improving border security through increases in 
Border Patrol staffing.
On Security:
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE REPORT
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HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE REPORT
•	 For more than a century, shared surface water resources 
have been managed according to bilateral treaties and 
agreements. The growing population of the border region 
and the advent of water intensive methods of drilling 
for oil and gas heighten the urgency for transboundary 
groundwater resources to be addressed proactively and 
binationally. Data sharing regarding subsurface water 
would be a natural place to start. 
•	 The La Paz agreement and the environmental institutions 
formed alongside NAFTA have focused U.S.-Mexico 
environmental cooperation on managing pollution in the 
border region. In order to promote the development of 
vibrant and sustainable communities, much more em-
phasis must be put on shared resource management.
•	 The potential for renewable energy in the border region 
is significant. Inadequate transmission infrastructure 
and limited incentives for renewable generation projects 
currently limit its development.
On Sustainability:
•	 The overall quality of life on both the U.S. and Mexican 
sides of the border region improved between 2000 and 
2010. Though there is still a major cross-border asymme-
try in many of the quality of life indicators, the quality of 
life gap between U.S. and Mexican border communities 
decreased slightly between 2000 and 2010.
•	 Lasting progress in improving quality of life can only 
result from the combination of independent national 
policies and binational efforts. Through complementa-
ry development strategies, the investments of each 
country can be mutually reinforcing, creating a virtu-
ous cycle of development and raising living standards.
On Quality of Life:
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INTRODUCTION
Christopher Wilson and Erik Lee
A Poorly Understood Region with Great Challenges and Even 
Greater Potential
Though more often characterized as a source of security threats and vulnerabil-
ities, the U.S.-Mexico border is also a modern frontier with immense opportuni-
ties. The joining together and in many ways overlapping of two great countries 
and societies has created a region fertile with business opportunities, rich in 
culture, and full of delicate natural treasures. Many of the unique opportunities 
presented by the border remain untapped, hidden away from the nations’ finan-
cial centers and capitals. But as those that live and work in the region know, 
the state of the border is stronger than most realize. For some time, this poorly 
understood area has needed a comprehensive and accessible yet careful and 
evidence-driven analysis for policymakers and citizens alike.
There is a traditional notion in foreign relations that ‘politics stops at the 
water’s edge,’ that domestic politics are 
distinct from foreign policy. While this con-
cept can be contradicted with cases from 
around the world, the complex and intense 
mix of local, state, national and internation-
al constituencies that have vested interests 
in the U.S.-Mexico border may comprise 
the best counterexample of all. Managing 
the U.S.-Mexico border is extraordinarily 
difficult and made more so by its intense 
mix of international and domestic policy 
issues. This is particularly true in the area 
of security. In a post-9/11 and post-Great 
Recession context, lawmakers and law enforcement officials in both countries 
Managing the 
U.S.-Mexico border is 
extraordinarily difficult 
and made more so by 
its intense mix of 
international and 
domestic policy issues.
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have been asked to make the border efficient and user-friendly for legitimate 
travelers and impenetrable for those with more nefarious objectives. The task 
is made more complicated by the fact that migration, drugs and border security 
are among the most politically charged issues in both countries while the U.S. 
and Mexican economies depend heavily on binational trade.  This enormous 
and poorly understood region presents both nations with policy challenges so 
vexing that they tend to obscure and overshadow areas of far more positive 
and even impressive interaction and collaboration. 
Border Management: A Binational and East-West Challenge
For those charged with negotiating the matrix of political and pragmatic 
challenges that make up the gauntlet of border policy, there are precious few 
axioms. Even the landmark North American Free Trade Agreement cannot quite 
frame the entirety of the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Through a historical process 
of trial and error, the two nations have arrived at, yet not fully implemented, 
two key concepts that can guide interaction at their shared border: coordination 
and collaboration. At the border, the United States and Mexico must manage 
complex transnational problems and remarkable shared opportunities. Water-
sheds and wildlife pay little attention to national boundaries, and transnational 
criminal groups actively seek to exploit regulatory and jurisdictional divides. 
But with a half-trillion dollars in bilateral trade powering the national economies 
throughout both countries, border management has implications that extend 
far beyond the border region itself.
In such an environment, cooperative binational solutions are often the only 
solutions. Unfortunately, an institutional void exists that makes managing such 
complex interaction across the U.S.-Mexico border particularly challenging. 
While the U.S. State Department and Mexico’s Foreign Ministry formally man-
age federal government-to-government interaction, a large number of federal 
agencies, state and local governments also have a significant say in how the 
border is run. Chief among these is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), formed in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001 to better orga-
nize U.S. efforts to defend itself from terrorist attacks. The importance of DHS 
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in border interaction cannot be overstated, and its creation represented both a 
securitization of the border, which made the border thicker for both illicit and le-
gitimate traffic, but also an effort to better coordinate border management.  In-
teragency coordination can also be difficult. Adding to this is the large number 
of state agencies as well as local governments that must conduct international 
work with their counterparts in the U.S. or Mexico. While there are formal and 
de facto agencies that manage our border interactions, no binational organi-
zation exists to coordinate efforts across areas such as those examined in this 
volume: quality of life, trade, security and 
environment.
In a curious way, the border tends to 
divide east and west as often as north 
and south. Officials, businesses and civil 
society in El Paso, for instance, are gener-
ally more accustomed to reaching across 
the border to speak with counterparts in 
Ciudad Juárez to manage a shared chal-
lenge than they are to do so with those 
in San Diego. While the existence of these north-to-south corridors of activity 
are natural and beneficial, the relative lack of trans-corridor communication and 
collaboration can be problematic and work against formulating helpful policies 
for the entire region. Healthy competition among corridors to attract business-
es and federal attention is a sign of a functioning market and democracy, but 
to the extent that border communities face common issues, they could also 
benefit by sharing best practices and speaking to their federal governments 
with a unified voice.
While much is left to be done, significant progress has also been made. In 
2010, the U.S. and Mexican presidents jointly affirmed their commitment to 
build a 21st Century Border. The initiative was formed around two key concepts. 
First, both governments’ interagency border management processes were 
aligned to strengthen domestic and especially binational coordination. Sec-
ond, they developed a conceptual framework that asserts border security and 
In a curious way, the 
border tends to divide 
east and west as often 
as north and south.
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efficiency need not come at the expense of one another, along with a series 
of implementing strategies. Officials on both sides of the border generally feel 
that the new coordinating mechanisms have effectively facilitated macro-level 
federal to federal coordination and joint planning, although major challenges 
remain in strengthening on-the-ground binational links to improve policy imple-
mentation. The implementation of policy tools to improve border security while 
reducing congestion—such as trusted traveler programs, customs preclear-
ance, lane management techniques, and new scanning and identification tech-
nologies—has generally advanced, though their potential is still much greater 
than current levels. Finally, the recently signed Colorado River Agreement 
represents a major advance in the joint management of shared resources and 
may serve not only as a model for future U.S.-Mexico collaboration but perhaps 
also as a precedent for the rest of the world. 
TREnds To FoLLoW on ThE  
U.s.-MExICo BoRdER
Citizens and policymakers alike rely heavily on key indicators to ascertain the 
current reality and potential future trends in a variety of public policy areas. For 
example, in the United States, measurements such as the Dow Jones Industri-
al Average and the unemployment rate are used as proxies for a broader notion 
of the country’s economic health and even drive other important factors such 
as investor and consumer confidence. In Mexico, the exchange rate between 
the peso and the U.S. dollar has historically been closely followed as an indica-
tor of the Mexican economy’s relative strength.
Unfortunately, there is no one measurement of the U.S.-Mexico border that 
can allow us in one simple glance to ascertain our progress on the major public 
policy issues. As we have tended to view the border through the lenses of 
immigration and security, perhaps the best-known measurement in the United 
States has been apprehensions of undocumented migrants by the U.S. Border 
Patrol.
But apprehensions are far from the best or only indicator of the health of the 
U.S.-Mexico border region. The State of the Border Report analyzes a vari-
ety of both qualitative and quantitative data in our chapters on quality of life, 
sustainability, security and trade. In many cases, data on the ideal indicators 
to measure each phenomenon is either unavailable or not complete enough 
to arrive at a definitive conclusion, in which case we either use the best data 
available or, at times, anecdotal evidence for clues on the progress or continu-
ing challenges in each public policy area we are analyzing. 
For this and other reasons we are developing the Transborder Development 
Index (TDI), the backbone of the Transborder Information System, a joint project 
between ASU’s School of Transborder Studies and El Colegio de la Frontera 
Norte intended to support decision makers in the public, private and social 
sectors. The TDI tracks four dimensions that are crucial for the integral devel-
opment of the U.S.-Mexico transborder region: competitiveness, sustainability, 
security and quality of life. The TDI is discussed in more depth in the chapter on 
quality of life.
Below we aim to give the reader a sampling of some of the key trends to fol-
low as the U.S.-Mexico border continues to evolve. 
QUALITy oF LIFE
The last several decades have seen remarkable population growth in the 
U.S.-Mexico border region, a demographic fact which heavily influences all as-
pects of life in the region, particularly in the areas looked at in this report: trade, 
sustainability and security. In his chapter on quality of life in the U.S.-Mexico 
border region, Francisco Lara notes, “In the last decade, border municipios and 
counties grew faster than their respective states and nations.” 
The table below shows current population estimates for each of the border 
configurations, along with average growth and doubling times.  Lara notes that 
in 2010, border municipios and counties, the border strip (100 km  to the north 
and 300 km to the south of the borderand border states), comprised 3.5%, 
7.4%, and 21.6%, respectively, of the combined population of the two coun-
tries. In the last decade, border municipios and counties grew faster than their 
respective states and nations. At current growth rates, the combined popula-
tion of border counties and municipios will double in about 35 years, reaching 
29 million residents in 2045 and comprising about 5% of the combined popula-
tion of both countries.  
Population and Population Growth in the  
Border Region (pg. 29)
 
Population 
2010
Average  
annual growth 
(%), 2000-2010
duplication 
Time (years)
Counties and municipios    
Mexico, border municipios 7,304,901 2.24 31
United States, border counties 7,303,754 1.62 43
 Total 14,608,655
100/300 kilometers
Mexico, 300 km 17,048,419 2.04 34
United States, 100 km 13,967,038 2.28 30
Total 31,015,457
Border states
Mexico 19,894,418 1.95 36
United States 70,850,713 1.49 47
  Total 90,745,131
Mexico 112,336,538 1.52 46
United states 308,745,538 0.97 71
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau and INEGI. 
sUsTAInABILITy
Groundwater is a key issue to watch over the next several years with regards 
to border region sustainability. As Carlos de la Parra, Rick Van Schoik and 
Kristofer Patron point out in their chapter, it is the lack of bilateral information 
sharing or agreements on transboundary groundwater resources that currently 
stands out. Nonetheless, as the growing population noted above and growing 
demands of industry and agriculture in the region put greater stress on these 
vital shared resources, joint management will become a necessity. As a result, 
one could reasonably suppose that the number of studies of shared ground-
water resources, independent and government sponsored, will increase in 
the years to come. What those studies find, and how the governments of the 
United States and Mexico respond to the challenges they bring to light, will be 
a key trend to follow. Hopefully the recent progress on joint management of 
the Colorado River watershed is a sign of the approach both nations, and the 
relevant subnational governments, choose to take.
TRAdE
The remarkable expansion of the U.S.-Mexico commercial relationship during 
the NAFTA era is an underappreciated story, as Erik Lee and Christopher 
Wilson point out in their chapter on bilateral trade. One graph from this chapter 
tells a variety of stories, including this increase in merchandise trade as well 
as an under-exploited area, services trade (which includes tourism, healthcare, 
transportation, financial services, etc.).
U.s.-Mexico Bilateral Trade in Goods and services, 
1993-2011 (pg. 62)
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Census Bureau
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sECURITy
As authors Eric Olson and Erik Lee note, “The state of security along the 
U.S.-Mexico border easily ranks as one of the most highly charged topics of 
public discussion and debate in both the United States and Mexico during the 
past several years.” Indeed, one of the key topics in the current discussion on 
comprehensive immigration control is establishing an objective measure of 
border security. 
The lack of a widely accepted measure of border security is one key reason 
for the ferocity of debate on this topic. Both U.S. and Mexican federal govern-
ment statistics have shown that violent crime continues to fall in the major 
cities along the U.S.-Mexico border, particularly San Diego, Tijuana, El Paso and 
Ciudad Juárez. Perhaps the best-known border security measurement in the 
United States has been apprehensions of undocumented migrants by the U.S. 
Border Patrol. While these numbers have been falling in a majority of Border 
Patrol sectors for a number of years, the relative importance of border enforce-
ment, economic cycles and other factors in determining immigration trends is 
the subject of debate, and immigration traffic tends to move east or west along 
the border in response to stepped-up enforcement efforts. The table below 
shows recent U.S. Border Patrol apprehension figures for the various Border 
Patrol sectors and the high points in apprehension statistics for each.
U.s. Border Patrol Apprehensions for southwest  
Border Patrol sectors, Fy 2011 and Fy 2012 (pg. 113) 
sector staffing
Fy 2011 
Apprehensions
Fy 2012  
Apprehensions
Peak  
Apprehen-
sions 1992-
2011/year
Big Bend 667 4,036 3,964 15,486 (1998)
Del Rio 1,626 16,144 21,720 157,178 (2000)
El Centro 1,164 30,191 23,916 238,126 (2000)
El Paso 2,738 10,345 9,678 285,781 (1993)
Laredo 1,871 36,053 44,872 141,893 (1997)
Rio Grande 
Valley
2,504 59,243 97,762 243,793 (1997)
San Diego 2,669 42,447 28,461 565,581 (1992)
Tucson 4,239 123,285 120,000 616,346 (2000)
Yuma 969 5,833 6,500 138,438 (2005)
Sources:  United States Border Patrol Apprehensions / Seizure Statistics - Fiscal Year 2011, 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/
fy_profile_2011.ctt/fy_profile_2011.pdf and United States Border Patrol Southwest Border 
Sectors Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions By Fiscal Year, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/
cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/usbp_fy12_stats/appr_swb.ctt/appr_
swb.pdf.
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Why This Report Now? 
The recent revival of discussions over immigration reform in the United States 
Congress also revived a related discussion over evaluating border security 
from an objective standpoint. In this context, several lawmakers called for the 
creation of a regional group of governors, attorneys general and other officials 
to evaluate whether the border was secure or not. Regardless of the outcome 
of the current efforts on immigration reform or this particular provision, its exis-
tence points toward the lack of non-partisan, evidence-driven analysis to inform 
debate among policymakers and citizens 
alike. The State of the Border Report was 
undertaken in order to address this lack 
of objective, longitudinal analysis within 
an overall qualitative framework that looks 
at the main goals and objectives of the 
binational relationship. The report seeks 
to provide analysis of the key issues, build 
a snapshot that can be revisited in the 
future to measure progress, and suggest 
strategies for better policy. 
We hope to demystify the border for 
Washington DC, Mexico City and the 
general public, bringing out the complexities of the real U.S.-Mexico border in 
a way that facilitates the development of policies that can achieve broad-based 
support on both sides of the border and across the political spectrum. In short, 
we hope to create a comprehensive, forward leaning, evidence-driven assess-
ment of the border.
organization of Report
The report is comprised of four core chapters on quality of life, sustainability, 
competitiveness and security as they relate to the U.S.-Mexico border region. 
Chapter One was written by Francisco Lara and focuses on quality of life 
For some time, 
this poorly understood 
area has needed a 
comprehensive and 
accessible yet careful 
and evidence-driven 
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issues. This chapter is cross-cutting and data intensive. Through the develop-
ment of the innovative Transborder Development Index (see box 1 in chapter 
2 for details on the TDI), Lara presents a comprehensive overview of life in 
the U.S. counties and Mexican municipalities that lie along the border, as well 
as a statistical baseline for future reports on the state of the border. He finds 
that despite the development of numerous new challenges that have devel-
oped in parts of the border region over the past decade, especially regarding 
public security, overall quality of life has increased. By grounding the reader 
in a statistical snapshot of life on the border, the chapter cuts through popular 
misconceptions about the region and sets the stage for the other three more 
policy-oriented chapters. Yet more than simply providing background informa-
tion, Lara suggests that a greater focus on economic and social development 
in the border region would complement and even magnify efforts to improve 
competitiveness, security, and sustainability.
Chapter Two focuses on the enormous—though underappreciated—U.S.-Mex-
ico commercial relationship. Border management directly affects this relation-
ship, as a large majority of this trade passes through the land ports of entry 
from San Ysidro/Tijuana to Brownsville/Matamoros. In “The State of Trade, 
Competitiveness and Economic Well-being in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region,” 
authors Christopher Wilson and Erik Lee argue that better, cooperative border 
management could not only fuel growth in the border region economy but 
could also create jobs and strengthen the competitiveness of manufacturers 
throughout both countries.  They identify opportunities to further implement 
new border management techniques, which make the border more difficult to 
cross for illegal and dangerous traffic while facilitating the flow of beneficial 
commerce.
Chapter Three looks at a fiercely debated topic: border security. In “The State 
of Security in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region,” authors Erik Lee and Eric Olson 
discuss how concerns about global terrorism, potential threats posed by those 
entering the United States illegally, and fears that skyrocketing violence in Mex-
ico might “spill over” into the United States have led to dramatic policy shifts 
and significant new investments by the United States to “secure” the border. 
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A snapshot of security issues at the U.S.-Mexico border reveals increasing—
though always controversial—federal involvement in a region that has histor-
ically maintained some degree of independence from both national capitals. 
The unprecedented post-9/11 U.S. security buildup along the border stands out 
as a key feature of the increased federal role and is exemplified by the buildup 
in federal personnel. The chapter suggests what may be a counterintuitive ap-
proach to border security--that instead of continuing to amass resources along 
the physical border itself, greater law enforcement cooperation to address risks 
far away from the border would be more effective.
Border security and regional development cannot be effectively addressed in 
isolation. They are mutually reinforcing, but they also depend greatly on the 
sustainable management of the resources—air, water, energy, land, wildlife 
and climate—that the people and businesses of the border region depend on 
as they live, work and play. Chapter Four, “The State of the Environment in the 
U.S.-Mexico Border Region,” by Carlos de la Parra, Rick Van Schoik and Kristofer 
Patron-Soberano, looks at the many areas in which the two nations interact, 
both officially and unofficially, on issues of sustainability. They find that even 
as advances have been made on several fronts, notably the management of 
the Colorado River watershed, the overall conceptual framework for binational 
environmental management needs to move beyond its traditional focus on 
issues of pollution in order to address the increasingly urgent challenges of 
shared resource management. This is an area of significant binational interde-
pendence and cooperation that does not often receive the attention it deserves 
and requires. 
Looking Forward, Looking outward
Though controversy often swirls around how the two nations monitor and 
regulate the border, current levels of coordination, cooperation, and under-
standing are unprecedented. Major steps forward have been taken in recent 
years, but at the same time the pressures put on the border region continue 
to evolve and continue to create significant policy challenges for both nations. 
The complex and interrelated challenges that must be managed to create a 
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secure, sustainable and competitive border demand ever greater cooperation 
and creativity along and across the nearly two thousand miles that make up the 
U.S.-Mexico boundary. 
Though far from easy to achieve, success in managing the intense interac-
tion and incredible diversity that make up the border is invaluable. It ripples 
outward. Of course, the 15 million people that live in the counties and munic-
ipalities along the border benefit enormously when the border is working. So 
do the 91 million residents of the border states who depend on the air, water 
and commerce that flow across the border. But far beyond the border, the six 
million people throughout the United States and many millions more in Mexico 
with jobs supported by bilateral trade depend in a very real way on the bor-
der’s ability to safely facilitate binational flows of people and goods. For them, 
an efficient border means a steady job, and an even more efficient border 
can lead to greater employment opportunities. Indeed, the competitiveness 
of the entire North American economy depends on the border. Should major 
advances in border management take root, the benefits of a better border have 
the potential to ripple out even further. Cross-border cooperation could send 
a signal that the complex transnational challenges that characterize the 21st 
century are better met in a context of mutual respect and shared responsibility 
than one of conflict and nationalism. Border management is difficult, but it is 
worth the effort.
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CHAPTER ONE: QUALITY OF LIFE 
IN THE UNITED STATES-MExICO 
BORDER REGION: CURRENT  
STATUS AND EMERGING TRENDS
Francisco Lara-Valencia
ExECUTIVE sUMMARy
This chapter provides a statistical snapshot of life along the border and devel-
ops a method to measure quality of life in the border region using accepted 
indicators and procedures, relying on comparable data from Mexico and 
the United States. The quality of life on each side of the border is intimately 
intertwined with the quality of life on the other side due to historical, social 
and geographical factors that connect the people and places in this region in a 
way that is unique. It is critical that policymakers on both sides of the border 
acknowledge this fact and make it an integral part of the plans and programs 
targeting economic opportunity, health, education, culture, and community 
life—that is, the quality of life—of the people living in the border region. 
The state of quality of life in the region is one of asymmetry and change. Be-
tween 2000 and 2010, the quality of life gap across the border became slightly 
less marked even as development remained asymmetrical. Mexican commu-
nities are ranked in the lower half of the scale for most indicators of wellbe-
ing. During the same period, and despite several new challenges, the overall 
wellbeing of the region increased. Still, there is much catch-up to do to close 
the gap and raise the quality of life for all residents in the transborder region. 
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This includes strengthening the emphasis on equity and the elimination of dis-
parities that disproportionately affect the educational, economic and health op-
portunities of the poor, ethnic minorities and other disfranchised social groups. 
A greater focus on quality of life would provide the opportunity to reframe the 
entire management strategy implemented in the border region over the past 
decades, crafting a new discourse, one based as much on human development 
as it is on trade, competitiveness and security. 
Lasting progress in improving quality of life can only result from the com-
bination of independent national policies and coordinated and collaborative 
cross-border efforts. On the Mexican side, several key challenges stand out, in-
cluding crime prevention, the expansion of educational opportunities for youth 
and the elimination of barriers that limit a greater participation of women in 
economic life. On the U.S. side, regional policies and plans need to target the 
reduction of infant mortality rates and poverty, chronic issues in border coun-
ties.  The two countries, including all levels of government, civic and private 
sector leaders, must work together to identify areas where public and private 
resources can be invested in more effective and innovative ways. By introduc-
ing complementary border development strategies, the investments of each 
country can be mutually reinforcing, creating a virtuous circle of development 
and rising living standards.  
The options at hand are broad in range. The two countries could benefit, for 
example, from greatly strengthening exchange programs that allow Mexican 
students to pursue graduate studies in the U.S. and vice versa. Such programs 
can contribute significantly to the formation of specialized human resources 
needed in Mexico, while strengthening intercultural competencies and human 
capital in the whole transborder region. Public-private partnerships offer anoth-
er opportunity, as shown by programs aiming to eliminate chronic cross-border 
gaps in health or poverty, such as the binational health councils, which combine 
local expertise and resources to fight communicable and chronic diseases 
resulting from social disparities. 
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Much work remains to be done to understand, accurately measure, and 
ultimately improve quality of life along and across the vast expanses of the 
U.S.-Mexico border region. By taking steps toward the development of reliable 
indicators for several of the dimensions of wellbeing and quality of life, this 
chapter seeks to provide policymakers the tools they need to take action in 
support of the millions of residents of the border region. 
KEy FIndInGs:
•	 The five U.S. border counties with the best quality of life are: 1. San Diego, 
CA, 2. Pima, AZ, 3. Brewster, Tx, 4. Jeff Davis, Tx, and 5. Cochise, AZ.
•	 The five Mexican border municipios (municipalities) with the best quality of 
life are: 1, Tijuana, BCN, 2. Mexicali, BCN, 3. Nogales, Son., 4. Tecate, BCN, 
and 5. Piedras Negras, Coah. 
•	 Growing faster than the national average in either country, between 2000 
and 2010 the combined population the U.S. border counties and Mexican 
municipios increased by 19.2%. This population will double in about 35 
years, with most of the growth occurring in mid-size and large urban con-
glomerates.
•	 Unemployment on the U.S. side of the border has been chronically high 
(Imperial Valley, CA had 29.7% unemployment in 2010), while Mexican 
border municipios enjoy lower than average rates.
•	 In 2010, an estimated 55 percent of the population aged 25 or above in 
border counties had earned the equivalent of a high-school degree or better. 
In comparison, 34 percent of the same cohort living in Mexican border 
municipios had completed at least high school.
•	 On average, border counties had 384 health workers per 10,000 residents 
in 2007, much greater than the average of 52 health workers per 10,000 
residents in border municipios.
•	 U.S. border counties have 59 non-profit sector workers per 10,000 resi-
dents, while border municipios have just seven per 10,000 residents.
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QUALITy oF LIFE
Introduction
The United States-Mexico borderlands present two characteristics that result 
in substantial challenges for traditional social and development policy.  First, 
as regional economic policies have 
largely ignored social and environmental 
issues, the deficits affecting the well-
being of people along the border have 
increased in magnitude. South of the 
border, income and employment levels 
above the national average coexist with 
health and education indicators that are 
clearly deficient from a Mexican stand-
point, while in the United States many 
border counties struggle with rampant 
poverty and disease levels that place 
them among the worst in the country. 
Second, the border is not only one of the 
fastest growing regions in North Amer-
ica; it is also a space where a long and 
profound history of cross-border human 
interactions is paralleled by deep national 
disparities. Oscar Martínez has noted 
that although the U.S.-Mexico border 
shares many characteristics with other 
border regions in the world, this region is 
unique because it comprises a territory 
where millions of citizens of “two very 
dissimilar nations” live shoulder to shoul-
der and interact with each other in a very intense and diverse way.1 
Quality of life reflects the 
extent to which citizens ben-
efit from public and private 
actions with impacts on the 
economy, education, equity, 
safety, and the livability and 
sustainability of the places 
where they live. At a more 
human level, quality of life 
is a synopsis of the impacts 
of market and government 
driven actions on the fulfill-
ment of personal and family 
aspirations of prosperity, 
health and happiness.
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In this context, during the past two decades, Mexico and the United States 
have aggressively pursued actions to reduce lingering deficits in their respec-
tive territories and jointly address chronic development gaps affecting both 
sides of the border. These include the promotion of trade and regional econom-
ic growth; substantial investment in environmental infrastructure; development 
of local capacity for planning and governance; and the creation of a new institu-
tional framework for cross-border cooperation. Despite such efforts, profound 
disparities still persist and the region as a whole continues to face substantial 
deficits in areas directly impacting the quality of life of its residents. In the last 
few years, an increasingly uncertain global economy along with widespread 
drug-trafficking related violence added new elements of deterioration and  
polarization to the living conditions of people, particularly in Mexican border 
communities.  Quality of life issues, therefore, have regained prominence in 
the region’s policy agenda, along with the need to better understand what is 
new and what remains unchanged in the living conditions and livelihood of 
border residents. 
This chapter reports and analyzes indicators generally used by specialists to 
ascertain whether a region is improving wellbeing and the living conditions of 
its residents. Because the aim of this chapter is to present a binational assess-
ment of the region, the indicators evaluated here refer to factors measured 
more or less consistently across the border and that have been identified as 
being valid markers of progress in improving quality of life at the local level. 
Therefore, this analysis excludes indicators for which information is available for 
only one side of the border and those with a geographical scope inconsistent 
with a local assessment of quality of life.
Although it is common to reduce the concept of quality of life to a mere indi-
cator of the prevailing living conditions, we prefer the idea that quality of life 
is ultimately a dimension of social life that absorbs and reflects the combined 
and dynamic effect of institutional and non-institutional factors on individual 
and collective wellbeing. In this chapter, quality of life is understood as a crucial 
dimension of development and public policy reflecting the extent to which citi-
zens benefit from public and private actions with impacts on the economy, ed-
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ucation, equity, safety, and the livability and sustainability of the places where 
they live. At a more human level, quality of life is a synopsis of the impacts of 
market and government driven actions on the fulfillment of personal and family 
aspirations of prosperity, health and happiness.   
The chapter is organized as follows: After this introduction, section two pres-
ents data that reveal some of the processes that make the U.S.-Mexico border 
unique from a social and development policy perspective. The third section 
provides an overview and analysis of quality of life indicators related to four 
overlapping domains: economic opportunity; education and culture; healthy life; 
and community life.  To the extent possible, the section assesses the cur-
rent status of indicators in these four domains, and tries to identify emerging 
trends.  It also covers output and outcome indicators in an attempt to capture 
the fluid nature of quality of life as well as the importance of basic minimums 
for wellbeing in general. Section four reviews the main result of a quality of life 
index (QOL) created to compare outcomes across the region and standardize 
the measurement of change across domains. The final section puts forward 
some conclusions and suggests some areas in need of intervention to improve 
wellbeing in the border region as a whole. 
The Regional Context
The United States-Mexico international boundary—from San Diego-Tijuana on 
the Pacific to the Brownsville-Matamoros area on the Gulf of Mexico—is the 
backbone of a distinct region where the interactions between the people and 
economies of Mexico and the United States are the most intense as well as 
the most diverse. Within the borderlands, trade, migration, tourism, rivers, and 
ecosystems are the conveyors of cross-border interactions infusing the region 
with its unique character as a hybrid and dynamic social space. As shown in 
Figure 1, the border region has different territorial configurations depending on 
the chosen definition. As explained by Gerber et al., each of these configura-
tions has the ability to capture cross-border processes that occur functionally at 
different spatial scales.2
The first of these configurations, and perhaps the most relevant from a policy 
Box 1: ThE TRAnsBoRdER  
dEVELoPMEnT IndEx
The Transborder Development Index (TDI) is the backbone of the Transbor-
der Information System, a joint project between the ASU’s School of Trans-
border Studies and El Colegio de la Frontera Norte intended to support 
decision makers in the public, private and social sectors. The TDI tracks four 
dimensions that are crucial for the integral development of the U.S.-Mexico 
transborder region: competitiveness, sustainability, security and quality of 
life.
The TDI aims to gauge the effectiveness of public policies, public-private 
partnerships, and citizen-based initiatives in moving the region toward high-
er development grounds and closing north-south and rural-urban develop-
ment gaps observable along the border. It also aims to provide a platform 
to evaluate and envision policies and strategies capable of moving the 
region quicker along a trajectory of comprehensive development.  
The TDI is a composite index comprised of sixty-four indicators grouped 
in four fully embedded and complementary sub-indices: competitiveness, 
sustainability, security, and the quality of life sub-index that this chapter de-
velops. After an extensive assessment of existing data sources in Mexico 
and in the United States, a group of variables was selected to construct 
the indicators. As the building blocks of the index, variables had to meet 
the standard of theoretical relevance, as well as the conditions of temporal, 
spatial and conceptual comparability required for an index able to compare 
directly states and municipalities across and along the border. The final se-
lection of variables and indicators was the result of a systematic evaluation 
process, guided by the goal of producing a measurement tool conceptually 
and methodologically robust, while maintaining an appropriate level of sim-
plicity and transparency for its use in the public, private and social sectors.
The index provides a panoptic view of the current status and progress of 
the U.S. states of Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas and the Mexi-
can States of Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Sonora and 
Tamaulipas, as well as the sixty-four counties and municipalities contiguous 
to the common international boundary.
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point of view, includes the forty Mexican municipios (municipalities) and 
twenty-four U.S. counties that straddle the international boundary. Under this 
definition, the administrative boundaries of municipios and counties outline a 
geographical scale where most of the social, economic and cultural interac-
tions that make the border region a binational space take place. The second 
configuration, adopted in 2004 by the North American Development Bank 
(NADBank) and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) for 
programmatic purposes, covers three hundred kilometers in Mexico and one 
hundred kilometers in the United States. Although clearly administrative in 
character, this definition captures important cross-border processes that take 
place at the scale of air basins or within regional economic corridors connect-
ing mid-size metropolitan markets like Hermosillo-Tucson and Saltillo-Monter-
rey-McAllen. A third configuration comprises the territories of the ten states 
– six in Mexico and four in the United States – that touch the international 
boundary. The relevance of this definition results from the important role played 
by state governments and public-private partnerships in promoting trade, tour-
ism, investments, educational exchange, or law enforcement cooperation. The 
substantial role played by state governments in border matters is illustrated by 
the uninterrupted work of organizations like the Arizona-Mexico Commission 
and the release in 2009 of the Strategic Guidelines for the Competitive and 
Sustainable Development of the U.S.-Mexico Transborder Region by the Border 
Governors Conference.3
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Figure 1: The different Territorial Configurations of the  
U.s.-Mexico Border Region
Source: School of Transborder Studies, Arizona State University, September 2012.
Regarding quality of life, there are four fundamental layers of cross-border 
amalgamation occurring with varied intensity at these different regional 
configurations: spatial confluence, functional articulation, institutional con-
vergence and social connectivity.
Spatial confluence is driven by population growth and rapid urbanization, 
two socio-territorial processes characteristic of the border in recent de-
cades. Table 1 shows current population estimates for each of the border 
configurations, along with average growth and doubling times.  In 2010, 
border municipios and counties, the 100/300-kilometer border strip, and 
border states, comprised 3.5%, 7.4%, and 21.6%, respectively, of the com-
bined population of the two countries. In the last decade, border municipios 
and counties grew faster than their respective states and nations. This 
higher pace of growth is the result of continued net migration to the region 
since at least 1950, and natural population growth rates exceeding national 
averages among most U.S. border counties.4 At current growth rates, the 
International Border
Border Counties and Municipios
BECC/NADBank Border Area
Border States
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combined population of border counties and municipios will double in about 35 
years, reaching 29 million residents in 2045 and comprising about 5% of the 
combined population of both countries.  
Table 1: Population and Population Growth in the Border Region 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau and INEGI. 
Central to the demographic expansion of the borderlands has been the rapid 
urbanization of the region. Cities like Tijuana, Juarez or Mexicali transitioned 
from medium-size border urbanizations in the 60s to burgeoning metropolises 
in recent times.5 In 2010, 93.7% of the population of the region lived in cities 
and urbanization rates exceeding 85% are the norm in most municipalities on 
both sides of the border. In fact, most of the region’s population growth in the 
next few decades will occur in mid-size and large urban centers intensifying 
an undergoing process of border metropolization. Especially on the Mexi-
can side, the pace of urban growth will be highest in large border cities and 
 
Population 
2010
Average  
annual growth 
(%), 2000-2010
duplication 
Time (years)
Counties and municipios    
Mexico, border municipios 7,304,901 2.24 31
United States, border 
counties 7,303,754 1.62
43
 Total 14,608,655
100/300 kilometers
Mexico, 300 km 17,048,419 2.04 34
United States, 100 km 13,967,038 2.28 30
Total 31,015,457
Border states
Mexico 19,894,418 1.95 36
United States 70,850,713 1.49 47
  Total 90,745,131
Mexico 112,336,538 1.52 46
United states 308,745,538 0.97 71
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municipalities and it is predicted that the proportion of the population living 
in urban centers with more than half a million people will rise to 58.1 percent 
in 2030, from about 44.6 percent in 2005.6 Already, urban conglomerates like 
Tijuana-San Diego and Brownsville-Matamoros fuse across the border, forming 
dynamic transborder metropolis-
es that are merging relentlessly 
with other border cities within 
their hinterland.7 Comparable 
processes of spatial confluence 
are observable in the El Paso del 
Norte region and even in smaller 
urban agglomerations like Ambos 
Nogales in the Sonora and Arizona 
border region.  The important point 
here is that the formation of these 
densely populated places along 
the border has serious implications 
for the wellbeing of the people 
living in them due to neighboring 
effects. On the positive side, the 
larger the urban agglomeration, the 
broader the range of choices border residents have in terms of consumption, 
amenities and jobs. On the negative side, larger conglomerations of people 
lead to congestion, pollution, crime, and health hazards.  The net result of the 
neighboring effects depends on the stability of cross-border interactions and 
the effectiveness of existing mechanisms of communication and collaboration 
across the border. 
Over time, and at varied levels, the borderland has evolved into an increas-
ingly interdependent regional space.  Examples of functional articulation are 
transborder tourism, trade, and supply-chains connecting the economies of 
both sides of the border region.8 Between 2000 and 2010, and average of 231 
million people and 85 million cars and buses crossed into the United States 
from Mexico, reflecting a highly integrated and interdependent region. After 
On the positive side, the 
larger the urban agglomer-
ation the broader the range 
of choices border residents 
have in term of consump-
tion, amenities and jobs. 
On the negative side, larger 
conglomerations of people 
lead to congestion, pollution, 
crime, and health hazards. 
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NAFTA, U.S.-Mexico trade flowing through existing border land ports grew 
vastly from $71 billion in 1995 to $255 billion in 2010.9 At the more local level, it 
has been estimated that an increase of 10% in maquiladora activity in Mexican 
border cities leads to an increase in employment in U.S. border cities thorough 
the expansion of wholesale trade (2.1-2.7%), transportation (1.7-2.1%) manu-
facturing (1.2-2.1%) and retail trade (1.0-1.8%).10 A not less telling marker of the 
level of functional articulation that connects communities along the border is 
the fact that many new businesses in U.S. border towns are being created by 
Mexican entrepreneurs and the retail sector in these places depends critically 
on Mexican cross-border shopping.11 The level of cross-border articulation also 
has direct implications on the wellbeing of border residents. The more articulat-
ed border economies become, the less control national communities have over 
forces and factors that define their wellbeing. Functional articulation results in 
complementarities and co-dependencies with potential effects on the standard 
of living of border residents. In periods of economic growth, functional articula-
tion has the potential to lead to greater economic benefits; however, in periods 
of poor growth it can actually make things worse. Increasing cross-border 
integration has both benefits and risks. In order for the benefits to outweigh 
the risks, policymakers must coordinate and collaborate across the internation-
al boundary.
The fact that the border is a bicultural space with local interests overlapping in 
a way that largely ignores the international boundary has demanded continuous 
coordination and cooperation among regional actors in a variety of areas with 
direct implications for the wellbeing of border communities. The result of this 
has been an assortment of local, regional, informal and official mechanisms of 
cross-border cooperation which have led to a degree of institutional conver-
gence unique to the borderlands. Some markers of institutional convergence 
in the U.S.-Mexican border region are the formation of binational organizations 
like the Border Environment Cooperation Commission, the U.S.-Mexico Border 
Health Commission or the Border Governors Conference. Comparable efforts 
at the local levels are the creation of the U.S.-Mexico Border Mayors Asso-
ciation or the U.S.-Mexico Border Philanthropy Partnership. Other examples 
are city-to-city, citizen coalitions and business partnerships created to resolve 
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particular problems or pursue broader agendas. All these entities have evolved 
into an important component of the institutional infrastructure and social capital 
created in the border to overcome the many barriers to collaboration result-
ing from national disparities and differences, and to cope with the structural 
contradictions of the relationship 
between the two countries.12 There 
are many examples of collaborative 
mechanisms along the border that 
facilitate the exchange of resourc-
es, enhance complementarities, 
build partnerships and promote 
policy action that contribute to 
close the development gaps and 
raise the wellbeing of border 
communities. The effectiveness 
of these mechanisms is critical for 
the quality of life afforded by the 
border to its residents.
Finally, according to the 2010 census, 10.3% (31,798,258) of the people living 
in the U.S. are of Mexican origin. More importantly, people of Mexican origin 
make up a much more significant percentage of the population in states bor-
dering Mexico: 31.6% in Texas, 30.7% in California, 28.7% in New Mexico and 
25.9% in Arizona. The concentration of Mexican origin population is even high-
er in border counties, with percentages ranging from 77-80% in metropolitan 
counties like Cameron and El Paso, along the eastern part of the border, and 
56-77% in more agricultural counties like Yuma and Imperial, in the western  
reach. Estimates from the American Community Survey indicate that in 2010 
about 45% of the Hispanic population in large metropolitan counties like San 
Diego, Pima and El Paso speak at home a language other than English, most 
likely Spanish, but also speaks English “very well.”13  Language is a basic 
ingredient of social identity, and linguistic practices along the border reflect the 
hybrid nature of the region as well as the bridging role of culture. As observed 
by Martínez14  this density of Mexican people and culture along the border is 
Transborder family relations are 
basic ingredients of quality of 
life and make the wellbeing of 
Mexico’s border communities 
inextricably linked to the 
wellbeing of United States’ 
border communities, 
and vice versa.
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the foundation of the thick transborder network of human interactions and 
also the platform that connects the wellbeing of residents on both sides of the 
border though family and blood ties. Transnational ties, particularly connections 
occurring in the context of transborder family relations, are the vehicle for the 
operation of support networks, including the transfer of income, job-finding 
tips, business opportunities, family conviviality, common friendship, and simple 
human solidarity.15 All of these interactions are basic ingredients of quality of 
life and make the wellbeing of Mexico’s border communities inextricably linked 
to the wellbeing of United States’ border communities, and vice versa.
In sum, spatial confluence, functional articulation, institutional convergence and 
social connectivity give meaning to the idea of a transborder region because 
they are the cause of externalities, multipliers, hybridization, integration, and, in 
general, the material basis for employment, wealth creation, identity, collabora-
tion, solidarity and the entire set of experiences that are unique to the people 
of the border.  
Four dimensions of Quality of Life
As seen above, people living in the border region face a much different set of 
factors affecting quality of life than the rest of the people of Mexico and the 
United States.  The unique nature of development in this region and the need 
to ground any conceptualization of wellbeing in this reality require a broad 
definition of quality of life, such as the one proposed by Dasgupta and Weale.  
According to these authors, quality of life is a multidimensional and multifacto-
rial concept that should be evaluated by looking at the constituents of well-be-
ing, as well as by measuring to what extent people have access to its determi-
nants. Health, income, and sense of belonging are examples of constituents 
of quality of life; while availability of shelter, sanitation, schools, health care, 
public safety, and employment are its most common determinants. It should 
be noted, however, that quality of life depends on the combined effect of these 
dimensions and factors, and not on the effect of any of them acting alone. We 
also acknowledge that quality of life is a dynamic construct that changes over 
time and across space. However, in order to operationalize and measure quality 
of life, we have to see it as a static phenomenon.
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In this analysis, we represent quality of life as the result of four dimensions: 
economic opportunity; education and culture; healthy life; and community life. 
Economic opportunity refers mostly to conditions that allow individuals and 
families to obtain the means to satisfy basic needs like nutrition, housing, and 
healthcare. Education and culture 
focus explicitly on aspects concern-
ing personal development and hu-
man capital accumulation at the in-
dividual and societal level. Healthy 
life is a dimension representing the 
ability of people to live longer and 
healthier lives.  Lastly, community 
life recognizes the role that man-
made and natural environments, in 
tandem with social factors, play in 
creating opportunities for a better 
life. The interaction and complementarity among these four dimensions are 
not only apparent but provide robustness to the concept of quality of life as a 
multidimensional phenomenon, as suggested above. 
The four domains and their corresponding indicators are summarized in figure 
2. Although we recognize the important role that subjective factors play in qual-
ity of life, all the indicators used in this analysis are of the objective type. There 
are several reasons for this. First, objective indicators are less costly to pro-
duce and much more are readily available on both sides of the border. Second, 
some studies have demonstrated that wellbeing and other subjective indica-
tors of quality of life are in the causal path that connects objective indicators 
with happiness, the ultimate representation of quality of life.16 Finally, objective 
indicators are also appropriate for regular tracking and evaluation, which is es-
sential to assess whether the different dimensions of quality of life are evolving 
as expected in light of relevant regional policies and plans.
In this analysis, we represent 
quality of life as the result of 
four dimensions: economic 
opportunity; education and 
culture; healthy life; and com-
munity life.
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Figure 2: domain and indicators of Quality of Life in the 
U.s.-Mexico Transborder Region
1. Labor participation
2. Poverty levels
3. Female economic participation
4. Family assets
1. Community groups and 
organizations
2. Net migration rates
3. Crime
4. Leisure and hospitality 
services
1. Educational attainment
2. Availability of educational 
services
3. Availability of information 
technologies
4. Production of information 
and cultural goods
1. Infant mortality
2. Motor vehicle related deaths
3. Availability of health services
4. Access to health services
QUALITy  
oF LIFE
Community 
Life
Education & 
Culture
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In the following section, we describe and analyze these indicators in order to 
provide an initial assessment of how the four dimensions of quality of life have 
evolved in the border region recently. 
Economic opportunity
Overall, the economic performance of the border region is indicated by its abil-
ity to create and maintain a high and steady number of jobs available to those 
residents able and willing to work in local businesses. Although the most 
direct benefit accrued by the local population from the job market is a secure 
flow of income, it is important to keep in mind that a stable supply of jobs also 
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contributes to the accumulation of human capital through the development of 
skills and competencies. Another indirect benefit of a stable labor market is the 
development of a sense of belonging and self-worth among those residents 
able to find and maintain a job. Therefore, communities with high levels of em-
ployment are not only wealthier, but also tend to enjoy greater social cohesion 
and stability.
Unemployment rates on the U.S. side of the border have been chronically high, 
ranging from 29.7% in Imperial Valley, California to 4.4 in Culberson, Texas in 
2010. The average for the region moved from 8.5% in 2000 to 11.9% in 2010, a 
steeper increase in the unemployment rate as compared to the United States 
as a whole which moved from 4.0% to 9.6% during the same period.17 In con-
trast, unemployment rates are comparatively lower in the Mexican side of the 
border, ranging from 1.0% in 2000 to 5.8% in 2010. National unemployment 
rates in Mexico moved from 2.6% to 5.4% in the same period.18
A key indicator of economic opportunity is the level of labor force participation, 
which is the proportion of the working age population that is economically ac-
tive. Figure 3 shows overall and gender-specific participation rates in 2010, ad-
justed to a lower age limit of 16 years, for both sides of the border. As can be 
seen, U.S. counties had higher overall participation rates (61.7%) than Mexican 
municipalities (57.9%). In addition, labor force participation rates were higher 
for men than women in all U.S. border counties and Mexican border municipali-
ties, although the size of the gender gap varied considerably across the border.
The largest gaps were in rural Mexican municipios, where the differences 
in rates in some instances exceeded 60%. The highest participation rates 
for women were recorded in highly urbanized municipalities with significant 
industrial activity: Tijuana, Nogales, Mexicali and Juarez.  These cities have 
large maquiladora industries, which still employ a significant proportion of the 
female labor force in the Mexican border region. Mexican municipios with a 
large hospitality sector, like Ensenada and Playas de Rosarito, Baja California 
also had high participation rates for women and, thus, a relatively low gender 
gap. Nevertheless, the gap in these municipios was three times as large as the 
average gap estimated for U.S. border counties alone.  
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Figure 3: Labor Participation Rates 2010–U.s.-Mexico Border 
Counties and Municipalities
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau and INEGI
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Overall, participation rates in border counties tend to be lower than the corre-
sponding U.S. participation rate, reflecting lower employment opportunities. 
Furthermore, 2010 labor participation rates for the border as a whole were 
lower that the corresponding estimates for 2000, reflecting a decline in em-
ployment opportunities in the region and, consequently, higher unemployment 
rates in 2010.  
While many studies show that money cannot be equated to happiness, mon-
etary income is an important vehicle to achieving higher living standards and 
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thus greater wellbeing.19  Higher income may also improve access to education, 
healthcare and housing, some of the most important determinants of quali-
ty of life. Overall, economic opportunity along the border is characterized by 
low wages; the dominant industries in the region are services, labor-intensive 
manufacturing, and agriculture. Particularly on the Mexican side, manufacturing 
typically does not require highly skilled labor and pays relatively low wages. 
Furthermore, the salary gap between Mexico and the U.S. has remained un-
changed during the decade as demonstrated by the fact that the compensation 
of Mexican workers in the manufacturing sectors was 16% of the compensa-
tion received by U.S. manufacturing workers in 2000 and 2010.20 
The U.S. Census Bureau uses monetary values of market priced goods and 
services to define poverty thresholds that are used to estimate how many 
households and persons fall below the poverty line. If a family’s total income 
is less than the threshold that corresponds to its size and age profile, then the 
whole family and each of its members are considered in poverty.  The official 
U.S. poverty thresholds do not vary geographically, but they are updated for 
inflation using the Consumer Price Index. In 2004, Mexico started using house-
hold monetary income to define a poverty threshold similar to those estimated 
by the U.S. Census.  Accordingly, a basket of goods and services valued at 
market prices is used to estimate a “wellbeing line” that is used to identify the 
population that lacks the necessary income to buy all of the goods and ser-
vices required to fulfill its food and non-food basic needs.21 Though these two 
measures of poverty are not directly comparable, their analysis provides a good 
overview of the challenges faced by border communities to provide economic 
opportunities to their members. 
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Figure 4: Population below the Poverty Line (%), Border states
Sources: U.S. Census and CONEVAL  
Figure 4 displays poverty levels for U.S. and Mexican border states.  The nation-
al poverty levels are used as a benchmark to compare the incidence of poverty 
in each state and the change in percentage of population below the poverty 
line. In the U.S., close to 15.3% of the national population was below the 
poverty line in 2010; with New Mexico (20.4%), Texas (17.9%) Arizona (17.4%) 
and California (15.8%) above this percentage. The U.S. poverty rate in 2010 
was the highest since 1993.22 On the other hand, Mexico’s poverty level was 
52% in 2010, almost 2 percentage points below the level observed in 2000. 
All Mexican border states recorded poverty levels below the national value, 
though the spread of observed values is substantial, as Chihuahua’s poverty 
level was slightly lower than the national level and Nuevo Leon was more than 
20% below.23
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Poverty data highlights what some authors have already referred to as the par-
adox of development, branding the U.S.-Mexico border region the place where 
the poorer of the first world meet the wealthier of the developing world.24
Education and Culture
The educational and cultural services that a region offers to its residents are 
critical for wellbeing because they provide individuals with the knowledge, 
information, skills and experiences needed to participate successfully in social 
and economic life. As indicated by Anderson and Gerber, education furnishes 
individuals with the competencies needed to live a healthier life, engage in 
civic activities, and benefit more from economic opportunities.25 For example, 
the OECD reports that men with college degrees are 18% more likely to find 
jobs than those with only a high school diploma and that their lifetime earn-
ings improve with schooling. The impact of education on job opportunities is 
even higher among women in OECD countries.26 Likewise, cultural services, 
including the different expressions of art and leisure activities, also play an 
important role in quality of life because they promote creativity and contribute 
to the development of a sense of belonging by engaging individuals with their 
communities.
While the Mexican government has made substantial investments in its 
educational system, Mexico is still at the bottom of the OECD rankings and is 
below several Latin American countries of similar income in terms of school 
attendance and educational attainment.27 In 2012, Mexico amended its con-
stitution to make high school education mandatory; in the U.S. this education 
level has been standard since the 1950s when high schools became common 
and provided free education to any student who chose to stay in school for 12 
years.28 Consequently, there is a historical gap in high school education enroll-
ment and graduation rates between Mexico and the U.S. This gap extends to 
other indicators of educational attainment, and it is quite apparent throughout 
the border region.
For example, in 2010 an estimated 55.1% of the population aged 25 and older 
of the 24 U.S. border counties had earned the equivalent of a high-school 
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degree or better. Residents of large metropolitan counties had slightly higher 
levels of educational attainment; at least 62% of residents of San Diego and 
Pima had successfully completed at least high school, compared with 45% 
of non-metropolitan counties. In contrast, 33.8% of the same cohort living in 
Mexican border municipalities had completed high school. Larger metropoli-
tan municipalities like Mexicali (39.9%), Nogales (38.1%), Tijuana (35.9%) and 
Reynosa (35.4%) had higher rates of their adult population that had completed 
at least high school. On the other hand, only 5 out of 24 U.S. border counties 
had populations aged 25 and older in which the percentage of members that 
had completed at least high school was fewer than 40%.
Figure 5: Population aged 25 years and over with at least a high 
school education (%)
Sources: U.S. Census and INEGI
As shown in figure 5, the difference between border counties and municipali-
ties relative to their corresponding states slightly favor the latter ones, but the 
data replicate the same asymmetric pattern described above. Overall, border 
states have larger percentages of residents with high school education than 
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border counties and municipios, 
although Mexican border states 
have significantly lower attainment 
levels in high school education 
than their U.S. counterparts.
In addition to education, human 
capital formation is also influenced 
by the quantity and quality of 
the cultural services offered by 
a region to its residents. Cultural 
services encompass programs and 
activities dedicated to enriching 
the lives of the local population by 
providing opportunities to experi-
ence the arts, knowledge, tradi-
tions, ecology, and other essential 
cultural experiences. To measure 
the cultural offerings in the border 
region we looked at the number 
of cultural workers as well as the 
number of people employed in establishments dedicated to the distribution of 
information and cultural products relative to the region’s general population. The 
first indicator was equal to 65 cultural workers per 10,000 residents in U.S. bor-
der counties, while the corresponding value in Mexican municipalities was 15.9 
cultural workers per 10,000 residents. Similarly, the second indicator showed 
84 people working in the distribution of information and cultural products indus-
try per 10,000 residents in U.S. border counties versus 37.5 in Mexican mu-
nicipalities. In relation to their corresponding states, border counties are more 
likely to be worse while Mexican municipalities tend to be slightly better. 
Overall, the border region has made significant progress in improving many of 
the key indicators in education and culture during the last decade. However, for 
the longer term, it will be essential to expand resource allocation to education 
Overall, the border region has 
made significant progress in 
improving many of the key indi-
cators in education and culture 
during the last decade. However, 
for the longer term, it will be es-
sential to expand resource allo-
cation to education and cultural 
services on both sides of the 
border to catch up and eliminate 
chronic deficits in capacity and 
performance.
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and cultural services on both sides of the border to catch up and eliminate 
chronic deficits in capacity and performance. Closing the gap between Mexico 
and the U.S. will require an additional effort to use existing budgets and human 
resources with greater efficiency, innovation and accountability. 
healthy Life
Obtaining services to detect and treat health problems along with acquiring 
preventive care and general health information are all issues related to the 
ability of populations to live a healthy life. It is well known that the availability of 
health insurance, the most important barrier to accessing health care services 
and information, varies with income and place. In comparison to national 
standards, residents of U.S. border counties are less likely to have adequate 
access to health care due to their inability to attain health insurance, either 
through employment or personal means. In 2010, the percentage of uninsured 
residents in border counties averaged 32.2%, while this percentage in the 
U.S. was 16.3%. The higher rates of uninsured residents in border counties 
are mainly because of the steep opportunity cost faced by low income families 
in areas with relatively high unemployment.29 Being much more industrialized 
and urbanized than the rest of Mexico, border municipalities afford compara-
tively high employment levels to their residents and thereby access to em-
ployer-based health services through the social security system. In 2010, the 
percentage of uninsured residents in Mexican border municipalities averaged 
34.6%, while the uninsured population reached 40% nationally. For the most 
part, uncovered populations on both sides of the border consist of impover-
ished and marginalized residents due to a steady inflow of migrants looking for 
opportunities in the region.   
An additional factor impacting access to health care in the border region is 
the lack of primary healthcare providers. Estimates by the U.S. and Mexican 
censuses on employment in establishments providing healthcare and social 
assistance for individuals give a glimpse of the relative availability of this critical 
human resource in the region.  On average, border counties had 384 health 
workers per 10,000 residents in 2007, with the ratio being substantially lower in 
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counties such as Santa Cruz, Arizona (212); Imperial, California (248); Hidalgo, 
New Mexico (257); and  Hudspeth (27) and Kinney (26) in Texas. Most of these 
counties are federally designated Health Professions Shortage Areas (HPSA) 
with high scores in their priority to receive assistance to recruit medical per-
sonnel. Among Mexican municipalities, estimates indicate these ratios were 
significantly lower, reaching on average 52 health workers per 10,000 residents 
in 2007.  
In order to further explore the implications of access to health services and 
resources, it is necessary to look at one of the most widely used indicators of 
the overall health status of a community. Figure 6 shows estimates of infant 
mortality rates for U.S. border counties and Mexican municipios in 2005. Infant 
mortality rates in border counties show a significant variability, with lows near 
2 infant deaths per 1,000 births and highs near 10.5 infant deaths per 1,000 
births. Although a definite pattern cannot be discerned from these numbers, 
higher infant mortality rates tend to concentrate in the most rural counties, 
such as Luna, New Mexico; Cochise, Arizona and Brewster, Hudspeth and 
Culberson in Texas.  It has to be observed, however, that infant mortality 
rates in U.S. border counties tend to be lower than the U.S. national rate, and 
many border counties are well beyond the Healthy People 2020 target of 6 
infant deaths per 1,000 live births.30 In contrast, Mexican border municipalities 
recorded rates ranging from 9 to 30 infant deaths per 1,000 births in 2005. The 
average rate for the 40 border municipalities was 16.4 infant deaths per 1,000 
live births, about 2.5 times higher than the average on the U.S. side of the bor-
der (6.4 /1000). Infant mortality rates also tend to be higher in those municipal-
ities with larger rural populations, where primary health care is less likely to be 
accessible or of good quality.
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Figure 6: Infant Mortality Rates  
(deaths per 1,000 live births in 2005)
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While the indicators used in this section cannot present a complete picture of 
health and health care in the whole region, they are indicative of the range of 
conditions border inhabitants must face in seeking a healthy life. For the most 
part, these conditions can be reduced to the fact that health services and re-
sources are scant in many border communities, limiting the choices individuals 
can make to preserve or improve physical and mental wellbeing. This contrib-
utes to well-known health disparities that affect populations that are relatively 
vulnerable to illness due to their income, ethnicity, age, gender or isolation. 
It is not a stretch to say that these disparities transcend the border, leaving 
populations on the Mexican side most vulnerable to poor health as indicated 
by stubborn differentials in health outcomes that characterize Mexican border 
communities vis-à-vis U.S. border communities. 
Community Life 
Quality of life is directly linked with the ability of a community to afford its 
members with the conditions and opportunities for social interaction, collec-
tive identity, and a sense of belonging. The frequency of social contacts within 
the community, for example, is not only correlated with the exchange of ideas 
that might evolve into shared understandings of local issues but also with the 
potential creation of bonds within the community. Constant social interactions 
require the presence of venues like parks or other communal spaces where 
local people can meet, feeling secure and stress-free. Using this notion as a 
basis, this section explores some indicators of the extent to which border com-
munities foster individual and collective wellbeing through social infrastructure, 
a sense of place and community safety.
The first of these indicators is the size of the local nonprofit sector represent-
ed by social advocacy institutions, unions, foundations, churches, and other 
community organizations promoting social and political causes. Though direct 
statistics about this sector are not readily available, a way to approximate its 
size is by calculating the ratio of total employment  in religious, grantmaking, 
civic, professional, and similar organizations to the total population in each 
border municipality.31 A high ratio will be indicative of an extensive social 
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infrastructure in the community available to provide support or promote the 
interest of local residents.  According to the census, in 2007 there were a total 
of 43,308 positions in the non-profit sector of the U.S. border counties, with 
an average of 1,805 employees per county.  Based on these numbers and 
considering the county population in 2010, the ratio of non-profit employees to 
population was 59.3 workers per 10,000 residents. In contrast, Mexican munic-
ipios recorded a total of 5,154 employees in non-profit establishments in 2009, 
resulting in an average of 129 employees per municipality. As a result, the ratio 
of employment to population is significantly lower on the Mexican side than in 
the U.S., reaching scarcely 7.1 non-profit workers per 10,000 residents. While 
this indicator fails to capture the informal nature of many non-profit endeavors 
on both sides of the border, but especially in Mexico, it gives a good idea of 
how developed and large they are. It is interesting to note that although the 
ratio of non-profit employees to population tends to be high in large metropol-
itan municipalities like San Diego (80.5), Pima (74.3), El Paso (41.9) or Mexicali 
(6.3), the highest ratios are found in smaller counties or municipios such as Jeff 
Davis (119.6), Terrell (101.6), Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (31.1) or General Plutarco Elias 
Calles (28.1)
Another indicator of collective wellbeing is the size and diversity of leisure and 
hospitality services available in the community. The availability of these ser-
vices in the community can be estimated by looking at the establishments that 
either provide services to meet varied cultural, entertainment, and recreational 
needs of local residents and visitors, including live performances, events, or 
exhibits of historical, cultural, or educational interest or provide services or facil-
ities that enable people to pursue amusement, hobby, and leisure-time inter-
ests. As with the previous indicator, a ratio of leisure and hospitality jobs to lo-
cal population can be estimated using census data. Assuming that higher ratios 
are correlated with better quality of life, wellbeing tends to be higher in U.S. 
counties than in Mexican municipalities. In 2007, the ratio of leisure and hos-
pitality jobs to population on the U.S. side of the border was 64.4 per 10,000 
residents compared to 15.9 per 10,000 on the Mexican side. Although large 
metropolitan counties like San Diego (102) and Pima (75) reported above-aver-
age ratios, not all large U.S. counties shared this characteristic. In fact, El Paso 
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(22), Hidalgo (19), and Webb (28) in Texas had ratios comparable in magnitude 
to those observed in Tijuana (26), Mexicali (19) and Ciudad Juarez (16). 
Quality of Life Index 
In this section, all the prior indicators are aggregated into a Quality of Life Index 
(QOL) created to provide a clearer image of this complex concept. Indices like 
these are frequently used to monitor social progress and trends over time and 
space. Aggregated indices are also used to compare outcomes within groups 
of nations or sub-national units as well as to examine potential connections 
between changing conditions, human behavior and policy choices. The QOL 
Index aims to provide compact and targeted information for management and 
policy development pertaining to border counties and municipalities, as well as 
highlighting existing complementarities and gaps.32 
Table 2 presents the estimated values of the 2000 and 2010 QOL index and the 
rankings of counties and municipios based on indicators in the four dimensions 
of quality of life we explored in the previous section. It is important to note that 
a rank of one represents the best performing county/municipality, while a rank 
of 64 represents the worst performing county/municipality. An examination of 
the rankings indicates that in 2010 the five best performing counties/municipal-
ities were San Diego, California (1), Pima, Arizona (2), Brewster, Texas (3), Jeff 
Davis, Texas (4), and Cochise, Arizona (5). The five worst performing counties/
municipalities were Manuel Benavidez, Chihuahua (64), Jimenez, Coahuila, 
(63), Ocampo, Chihuahua (62), Santa Cruz, Sonora (61) and Sáric, Sonora (60). 
The grouping at the top of the ranking did not change much between 2000 
and 2010, though the drop of El Paso, which passed from 4th to 9th place 
during the decade, is noticeable. At the bottom, the most striking change is 
the upward movement of Hidalgo, Coahuila, which jumped from 63rd to 52nd 
place. While El Paso, relative to other border counties and municipalities, did 
not make significant improvement in any dimension of quality of life included in 
the index, Hidalgo, Coahuila outperformed most municipalities in the indicators 
of economic opportunity and community life. Better performance than the ma-
jority of other counties and municipalities is indicated by the double plus sign in 
the last four columns of table 2.
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Table 2: Quality of Life Ranking and dimensions, 2000-2010.
County/  
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Change in Dimensions 
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San Diego California 1 0.85 1 0.91 +
Pima Arizona 2 0.81 2 0.84
Brewster Texas 3 0.74 3 0.74
Jeff Davis Texas 4 0.73 5 0.69 ++ +
Cochise Arizona 5 0.69 6 0.67 +
Yuma Arizona 6 0.69 10 0.57 ++ +
Val Verde Texas 7 0.68 9 0.58 + ++
Dona Ana New Mex-
ico
8 0.68 7 0.63 +
El Paso Texas 9 0.67 4 0.71
Maverick Texas 10 0.65 21 0.44 + ++ ++ ++
Santa Cruz Arizona 11 0.63 11 0.55 + +
Cameron Texas 12 0.62 8 0.61
Presidio Texas 13 0.62 20 0.45 ++ ++
Hidalgo Texas 14 0.61 13 0.53 ++
Webb Texas 15 0.61 15 0.51 ++ ++
Imperial California 16 0.60 17 0.49 + +
Culberson Texas 17 0.59 14 0.52 ++ ++
Kinney Texas 18 0.59 18 0.47 ++ ++ +
Terrell Texas 19 0.58 22 0.42 ++ + ++
Hidalgo New Mex-
ico
20 0.57 12 0.53 + +
Starr Texas 21 0.57 23 0.39 ++ + ++
Luna New Mex-
ico
22 0.54 16 0.51 + +
Tijuana B. California 23 0.51 25 0.37 ++ + ++ +
Zapata Texas 24 0.50 24 0.38 + + + ++
Mexicali B. California 25 0.47 27 0.35 ++ + +
Hudspeth Texas 26 0.47 19 0.45 ++ +
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Nogales Sonora 27 0.45 33 0.29 ++ ++ +
Tecate B. California 28 0.45 28 0.31 + ++ ++
Piedras Negras Coahuila 29 0.45 32 0.30 ++ + ++
Juárez Chihuahua 30 0.44 26 0.35 ++ +
Reynosa Tamaulipas 31 0.44 30 0.31 ++ + +
Ensenada B. California 32 0.44 29 0.31 + ++ +
Playas de Rosarito B. California 33 0.42 37 0.28 ++ +
San Luis Río 
Colorado
Sonora 34 0.41 35 0.28 + + +
Nuevo Laredo Tamaulipas 35 0.40 34 0.29 + + +
Matamoros Tamaulipas 36 0.40 36 0.28 ++ +
Puerto Peñasco Sonora 37 0.40 44 0.24 + ++ + +
Acuña Coahuila 38 0.39 42 0.24 + ++ ++
Miguel Alemán Tamaulipas 39 0.39 31 0.31 ++ +
Agua Prieta Sonora 40 0.38 38 0.27 ++ ++
Caborca Sonora 41 0.37 40 0.25 ++ ++
Mier Tamaulipas 42 0.37 39 0.26 ++ +
Naco Sonora 43 0.36 45 0.24 + ++ ++
Gustavo Díaz 
Ordaz
Tamaulipas 44 0.33 43 0.24 + ++ ++
Valle Hermoso Tamaulipas 45 0.31 51 0.20 + ++
Gral. P. Elías Calles Sonora 46 0.31 41 0.25 ++ +
Río Bravo Tamaulipas 47 0.31 49 0.21 + ++
Ojinaga Chihuahua 48 0.30 47 0.22 ++
Anáhuac Nuevo León 49 0.30 56 0.16 ++ ++
Nava Coahuila 50 0.30 50 0.21 + + ++
Camargo Tamaulipas 51 0.29 46 0.22 ++
Hidalgo Coahuila 52 0.25 63 0.09 ++ ++
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Ascensión Chihuahua 53 0.25 55 0.16 + ++
Altar Sonora 54 0.25 54 0.17 + + ++
Guerrero Tamaulipas 55 0.23 48 0.21 ++
Guadalupe Chihuahua 56 0.22 53 0.18 +
Praxedis G. Guer-
rero
Chihuahua 57 0.22 52 0.19 +
Guerrero Coahuila 58 0.19 61 0.12 ++ +
Janos Chihuahua 59 0.18 59 0.14 ++
Sáric Sonora 60 0.17 64 0.08 ++
Santa Cruz Sonora 61 0.15 57 0.14
Ocampo Coahuila 62 0.14 58 0.14 +
Jiménez Coahuila 63 0.13 60 0.12 +
Manuel Benavides Chihuahua 64 0.13 62 0.11 +
* Above 75 percentile (++); above the median (+).
Other counties that experienced substantial upward shifts in their ranking 
were Maverick and Presidio in Texas, which performed very well in indicators 
of education and culture, as well as in healthy life. Yuma, Arizona also showed 
a substantial jump in its ranking due mainly to improvements in economic 
opportunities and education and culture. On the Mexican side, Puerto Peñas-
co; Nogales, Sonora; and Anahuac, Nuevo Leon also moved upward, although 
for different reasons. In the case of these three municipalities, improvement 
resulted from good performance in all dimensions but particularly in economic 
opportunity and education and culture indicators.    
In the aggregate, large metropolitan municipalities are more likely to offer bet-
ter economic opportunities than smaller ones, yet this is truer for the Mexican 
side than for the U.S. side of the border. In fact, among U.S. border counties, 
there are a few small rural jurisdictions with high standings because they per-
form as well as larger counties in terms of labor force and poverty indicators. 
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This is clearly the case of Brewster and Jeff Davis in Texas, whose natural-re-
source based economies have created a more stable regional economy with 
steady employment and income levels in the Big Bend area. Large municipal-
ities such as Tijuana, Mexicali, Juarez or Nogales have a better ranking among 
Mexican municipios because of the central role their economies play in the 
economic interaction between Mexico and the U.S. and because of their large 
share of their respective regional markets. The index also shows a substantial 
economic gap between Mexican and U.S. municipalities, as indicated by the 
fact that only two small rural counties in Texas produced scores comparable to 
those of larger municipalities like Tijuana, Juarez and Nogales. This gap stems 
mainly from the much higher poverty levels in Mexico along with the substan-
tial disparity in female and male labor participation rates that were observed 
before. 
A similar pattern is observable in the area of education and culture, although 
the divide between metropolitan and rural municipalities is clearly more intense 
irrespective of the side of the border. This is understandable since large metro-
politan areas in both countries are normally the seat of regional universities and 
home to larger school districts, which is reflected in higher educator to pop-
ulation, greater educational attainment levels and a broader range of cultural 
services. In fact, the overlap between both sides of the border is the highest 
in this particular dimension, as indicated by the significant number of counties 
with scores below those of the best ranked Mexican municipios.
In the area of health, the indicators used to measure healthy life reflect a great-
er variability. First, counties and municipalities of intermediate size are among 
those jurisdictions with better rankings, including Starr, Maverick and Valverde 
in Texas along with Piedras Negras, Coahuila; Mier, Tamaulipas and Naco, Sono-
ra. For the most part, this reflects the influence of mid-size population centers 
where the availability of medical care is normally adequate and health hazards 
resulting from long commutes and traffic congestion are moderate due to the 
size of the cities in these jurisdictions. Secondly, although the overlap between 
health indicators on both sides of the border is minimal in comparison with the 
other dimensions included in the index, the scores of Mexican municipios tend 
to be clustered around values that are closer to the scores of U.S. counties. 
53 The State of the Border Report
This indicates a less intense disparity between both sides of the border reflect-
ing the quasi-universal access and institutionalized character of medical care in 
Mexico.
Finally, community life is the dimension where 
the combined effect of the indicators results 
in the lowest variability within the region.  Yet, 
U.S. counties tend to cluster in the highest 
segment of the ranking and Mexican municip-
ios in the lowest section. The overlap between 
U.S. counties and Mexican municipalities in this 
dimension is minimal due to the high incidence 
of homicides south of the border, particularly 
in the states of Chihuahua and Tamaulipas. In 
contrast, data show that that this type of crime 
along the U.S. side of the international bound-
ary is very low, even for national and statewide 
standards, and border counties as a whole did 
not experience an increase in violent crimes between 2000 and 2010.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This chapter provides a snapshot of the border region’s quality of life. Quality 
of life was measured and evaluated using accepted indicators and procedures, 
relying on data from publicly available sources in Mexico and the United States. 
The data and the analysis presented in this chapter offer several insights that 
are relevant to policymakers, practitioners and researchers alike.
The quality of life on each side of the border is intimately intertwined with the 
quality of life on the other side due to historical, social and geographical factors 
that connect the people and places in this region in a way that is unique. It is 
critical that policymakers on both sides of the border acknowledge this fact and 
make it an integral part of the plans and programs targeting economic opportu-
nity, health, education, culture, and community life—that is, the quality of life—
of the people living in the border region. 
Large metropolitan 
municipalities are more 
likely to offer better 
economic opportunities 
than smaller ones, yet 
this is truer for the Mex-
ican side than for the 
U.S. side of the border.
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The state of quality of life in the region is one of asymmetry and change. Be-
tween 2000 and 2010, the quality of life gap across the border became slightly 
less marked even as development remained asymmetrical. Mexican communi-
ties occupy the lower half of the scale for most indicators of wellbeing. During 
the same period, and despite several new challenges, the overall wellbeing of 
the region has increased. Still, there is much catch-up to do to close the gap 
and raise the quality of life for all residents in the transborder region. This in-
cludes strengthening the emphasis on equity and the elimination of disparities 
that disproportionately affect the educational, economic and health opportu-
nities of the poor, ethnic minorities and other disfranchised social groups. A 
greater focus on quality of life would provide the opportunity to reframe the en-
tire management strategy implemented in the border region in recent decades, 
crafting a new discourse, one based as much on human development as it is 
on trade, competitiveness and security. 
Lasting progress in improving quality of life can only result from the com-
bination of independent national policies and coordinated and collaborative 
cross-border efforts. On the Mexican side, several key challenges stand out, 
including crime prevention, the expansion of educational opportunities for 
youth and the elimination of barriers that limit greater participation of women 
in economic life. On the U.S. side, regional policies and plans need to target 
reduction of infant mortality rates and poverty, which have been chronically 
substandard in border counties.  The two countries, including all levels of 
government, civic and private sector leaders, must work together to identify 
areas where public and private resources can be invested in more effective and 
innovative ways. By introducing complementary border development strate-
gies, the investments of each country can be mutually reinforcing, creating a 
virtuous circle of development and rising living standards.  
The options at hand are broad in range. The two countries could benefit, for 
example, from greatly strengthening exchange programs that allow Mexican 
students to pursue graduate studies in the U.S. and vice versa. Such programs 
can contribute significantly to the formation of specialized human resources 
desperately needed in Mexico, while strengthening intercultural competencies 
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and human capital in the whole transborder region. Public-private partnerships 
offer another opportunity, as shown by programs aiming to eliminate chronic 
cross-border gaps in health or poverty, such as the binational health councils, 
which combine local expertise and resources to fight communicable and chron-
ic diseases resulting from social disparities. 
Much remains to be done to flesh out a fully comprehensive assessment and 
measurement of quality of life in the U.S.-Mexico transborder region.  First, 
further examination of our initial set of dimensions and indicators is needed, 
to explore their validity in the particular context of the U.S.-Mexico border 
and for different subpopulations and geographies within this region. Further 
work should also be undertaken to test and verify the value of this initial set 
of indicators in consideration of the aim of describing and tracking quality of 
life changes over time and across the border. Second, the selection of these 
indicators was based largely on the availability of data. There are certainly other 
possible indicators of quality of life worthy of exploration. 
Lastly, the goal of this report and the Quality of Life Index is to provide border 
communities and policy-makers with a trustworthy metric of complementari-
ties and development gaps, offering clear, credible and systematic reporting on 
progress toward higher wellbeing and lesser disparities across the region. By 
taking steps toward the development of reliable indicators, this chapter seeks 
to provide policymakers the tools they need to take action in support of the 
millions of residents of the border region. In order to move from evaluation and 
measurement into coordinated and effective action, it will be vital to work in 
partnership with a broad array of Mexican and U.S. organizations and institu-
tions working to enhance the wellbeing of border communities.
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CHAPTER 2: THE STATE OF TRADE,  
COMPETITIVENESS AND  
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING IN THE 
U.S.-MExICO BORDER REGION
Christopher E. Wilson and Erik Lee
 
ExECUTIVE sUMMARy
Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great—yet under-
appreciated—success stories of the global economy. In fact, in 2011 U.S.-Mexico 
goods and services trade reached the major milestone of one-half trillion dollars with 
virtually no recognition.1 The United States is Mexico’s top trading partner, and Mex-
ico—which has gained macroeconomic stability and expanded its middle class over 
the last two decades—is the United States’ second largest export market and third 
largest trading partner. Seventy percent of bilateral commerce crosses the border 
via trucks, meaning the border region is literally where “the rubber hits the road” 
for bilateral relations. This also means that not only California and Baja California, but 
also Michigan and Michoacán, all have a major stake in efficient and secure border 
management.
Unfortunately, the infrastructure and capacity of the ports of entry to process goods 
and individuals entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of 
bilateral trade or the population growth of the border region. Instead, the need for 
greater border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a thickening of 
the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding costly, long 
and unpredictable wait times for commercial and personal crossers alike. Congestion 
acts as a drag on the competitiveness of the region and of the United States and 
Mexico in their entirety. Solutions are needed that strengthen both border security 
and efficiency at the same time. The development of the 21st Century Border initia-
tive by the Obama and Calderón administrations has yielded some advances in this 
direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled. 
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Moderate investments to update infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of 
entry are certainly needed, as long lines and overworked staff promote neither 
efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight federal budgets, asking for more 
resources cannot be the only answer. Strategic efforts that do more with less, 
improving efficiency and reducing congestion, are also needed. Trusted traveler 
and shipper programs (i.e. SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT, Global Entry) allow vetted, 
low-risk individuals and shipments expedited passage across the border. Im-
proving these programs and significantly expanding enrollment could increase 
throughput with minimal investments in infrastructure and staffing—all while 
strengthening security by giving border officials more time to focus on un-
known and potentially dangerous individuals and shipments.
The border region tends to organize itself in terms of north-south trade corri-
dors as a natural result of the cross-border relationships that facilitate the flow 
of goods. This phenomenon manifests itself in the development of everything 
from interest groups to regional border master plans. Without a doubt, eco-
nomic development and competitiveness in the region is anything but uniform, 
ranging from the great wealth of San Diego to the pockets of severe poverty in 
the Rio Grande Valley, from the aerospace cluster in Baja California to the vast 
deserts of Sonora and Coahuila. Despite this tremendous diversity and even a 
fair bit of competition to pull trade flows into one’s own region, border com-
munities have more than enough common interests to warrant border-wide 
planning, stakeholder organization, and the sharing of best practices. Recently, 
crime and violence in certain Mexican border communities has dominated the 
national perceptions of the region in both the United States and Mexico. To 
the extent that the border communities and border states speak with a unified 
voice, they will have a better opportunity to put forth their own narrative about 
the region and to call for appropriate revisions to national border policies.  
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EConoMICs
The national Economic Impact of Bilateral Trade and  
Border Management
Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great yet 
highly underappreciated success stories of the global economy.  The United 
States is Mexico’s top trading partner, and Mexico—which has made enormous 
strides in its macroeconomic picture in the last two decades—is the United 
States’ third-ranked partner in terms of total trade. 
The economic vitality of the U.S.-Mexico border region—which includes manu-
facturing, infrastructure, human capital and tourism, among other elements—is 
a key part of this overall economic success. With more than a billion dollars of 
commercial traffic crossing the border each day, it is literally at the U.S.-Mexico 
border region where the rubber hits the road in terms of this expanded regional 
trade. This is because more than 70% of total binational commerce passes 
through the border region via trucks. This already massive truck traffic is expect-
ed to increase significantly in the coming decades (see Figure 2 below).
Figure 1: U.s.-Mexico Bilateral Trade in Goods and services, 
1993-2011
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Since the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 
1994, total trade between the two countries has more than quintupled, and 
goods and services trade is now at a half trillion dollars per year. An estimated 
six million U.S. jobs and probably even more Mexican jobs depend on  
bilateral trade.2 
  
The six Mexican and four U.S. border states have especially close bilateral eco-
nomic ties, but what is often unappreciated is that this economic value extends 
far beyond the border region. Mexico, for example, is the top buyer of exports 
from states as far away as New Hampshire (mostly computers and electron-
ics). In fact, Mexico is the first or second most important export market for 
twenty-one states from Colorado to Ohio, and twenty U.S. states sell more 
than a billion dollars’ worth of goods to Mexico each year. The United States is 
an even more important market for Mexican exports. Seventy-nine percent of 
Mexican exports are sold to the United States, including products produced in 
the border region and throughout the country.3 Crude oil, for example, which is 
mostly produced in Mexico’s Gulf Coast states, is the top single export to the 
United States, but automobiles and auto-parts, which make up an even greater 
share of exports when taken together, are 
mainly made in the center and north of 
the country.4
The quantity of U.S.-Mexico trade is im-
pressive, but its quality makes it unique. 
The United States and Mexico do not just 
sell goods to one another, they actually 
work together to manufacture them. 
Through a process known as production 
sharing, materials and parts often cross 
back and forth between factories on each 
side of the border as a final product is 
made and assembled. As a result, U.S. 
imports from Mexico contain, on average, 40 percent U.S. content, and Mexi-
co’s imports from the U.S. also have a high level of Mexican content.5 
The six Mexican and four 
U.S. border states have 
especially close bilateral 
economic ties, but what 
is often unappreciated is 
that this economic value 
extends far beyond the 
border region.
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This system of joint production has two important consequences. First, it 
means that our economies are profoundly linked. We tend to experience 
growth and recession together, and productivity gains or losses on one side 
of the border generally cause a corresponding gain or loss in competitiveness 
on the other side as well. In sum, we will 
largely succeed or fail together and must 
therefore join forces to increase the com-
petitiveness of the region. Second, the fact 
that goods often cross the border several 
times as they are being produced creates 
a multiplier effect for gains and losses in 
border efficiency. Whereas goods from 
China only go through customs and inspec-
tion once as they enter the U.S. or Mexico, 
products built by regional manufacturers 
bear the costs of long and unpredictable 
border wait times and significant customs 
requirements each time they cross the 
U.S.-Mexico border.
Leading industrial sectors in U.S.-Mexico trade include automobiles, aerospace, 
home appliances, and medical devices, to name but a few. We often find 
extremely high-skilled labor involved in complex aspects of U.S.-Mexico trade, 
including custom parts, metal work and products requiring skilled labor. These 
processes often link designers, developers, raw materials producers and parts 
manufacturers in the United States to high skilled labor, engineers, and plant 
managers in Mexico. While in truth both countries participate in all parts of the 
supply chain depending on the product, these are some broad characteristics 
that often hold true for which parts of the manufacturing process each country 
specializes in.
In addition to manufactured goods, agricultural products also flow between 
the two countries. This includes U.S. exports of food products (grains and 
processed foods) from states such as South Dakota, Nebraska, and Iowa, as 
The fact that goods 
often cross the 
border several times 
as they are being 
produced creates a 
multiplier effect for 
gains and losses in 
border efficiency.
65 The State of the Border Report
well as Mexican fruit and vegetable exports from key states such as Sinaloa and 
Michoacán. 
As a final point to introduce this macro view of U.S.-Mexico trade, it must be 
emphasized that this trade relationship requires major infrastructure to function 
effectively. The largest trade corridor, often referred to as the NASCO corridor, 
links central and eastern Mexico to Texas, the American Midwest, Northeast, 
and Ontario, utilizing the key Laredo-Nuevo Laredo ports of entry (POEs). 
Other important trade arteries include the CANAMEx Corridor, which connects 
western Mexico to the intermountain United States and Canadian province of 
Alberta, as well as the shorter but high-volume I-5 corridor connecting Califor-
nia to Baja California.  As the economies of both the U.S. and Mexico grow, it 
is likely that this network of freight transportation infrastructure—and the land 
ports of entry that serve as nodes in this network—will experience added stress 
(see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Projected Truck Flows for 2020 
(total number of trucks per year)
Source: Mexican Ministry of Transportation and Communications (SCT), 2005
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Tourism is another key economic driver for the region. Mexico is the number 
one foreign destination for U.S. tourists, and Mexican tourists comprise the 
second largest group of foreign visits to the United States each year (see Table 
1 below). Statistics on Mexican tourist spending in the U.S. are incomplete 
because of the heavy usage of U.S. bank cards and cash by Mexican tourists, 
thereby making statistical analysis of this group of tourists particularly chal-
lenging. Yet even with this incomplete picture, Mexican tourist spending ranks 
fourth, according to U.S. Department of Commerce statistics from 2010.
Table 1: Top sources of Tourism and International spending 
for the United states, 2010  
Country
Arrivals 
(millions)
Rank
spending  
(billions of Usd)
Rank
Canada 19.96 1 20.8 1
Mexico 13.47 2 8.7 4
United  
Kingdom 3.85 3 11.6 3
Japan 3.39 4 14.6 2
Germany 1.73 5 5.8 6
France 1.34 6 4.1 8
Brazil 1.2 7 5.9 5
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Travel and Tourism Industries
The large majority (85%) of Mexican arrivals to the U.S. occur at the land ports 
of entry along our shared border. These tourists have a significant economic 
impact upon the communities they visit and the states that receive sales and 
other taxes they pay. To take one example, according to a study by the Univer-
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sity of Arizona on Mexican visitors to Arizona, in 2007-08 Mexican visitors spent 
$2.69 billion in the state of Arizona, generating 23,400 direct jobs and 7,000 
indirect jobs in the state. 
It is the land ports of entry, then, that play the pivotal role in facilitating commer-
cial exchange between the United States and Mexico. The health of both the 
national economies and the more local border-specific economies rests upon 
the relative health or weakness of these gateways. 
Managing the Land Ports of Entry: Increasing Capacity to Ease 
Congestion
Two major events have transformed the dynamics of bilateral trade and border 
management over the past few decades, and an important third one may be un-
derway. The implementation of the 
North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) in 1994 eliminated 
most tariffs and caused bilateral 
trade to skyrocket. Merchandise 
trade has more than quintupled 
since NAFTA was put in place, but 
its growth has not been entirely 
steady. After the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 and the accession of China to 
the WTO in 2001, regional trade and 
manufacturing sputtered. The need 
for increased vigilance at the U.S. 
borders came at a cost for regional manufacturers and border communities.6 
Longer and unpredictable wait times at the border cut away at the competitive-
ness of regional industries and many U.S. and Mexican factories were offshored 
to Asia.7 Whereas bilateral trade had grown at a rate of 17 percent per year from 
1993-2000, it only grew 4.5 percent per year from 2000-2008. 
Long and unpredictable 
wait times at the  
POEs are costing the  
United States and  
Mexican economies 
many billions of  
dollars each year.
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Figure 3: northbound Port-of-Entry Border Crossers,  
1995 – 2011 (millions)
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administra-
tion, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, based on data from the Department of Homeland 
Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field Operations, 2012.
The recent economic crisis has drawn attention to the serious need for efforts 
to increase the competiveness of regional industry that could lead to a re-
newed emphasis on the trade facilitation portion of the Customs and Border 
Protection mission. The integrated nature of the North American manufactur-
ing sector makes eliminating border congestion an important way to enhance 
regional competitiveness. The global economic crisis forced manufacturers 
to look for ways to cut costs. After taking into consideration factors such as 
rising fuel costs, increasing wages in China and the ability to automate an ever 
greater portion of the production process, many American companies decided 
to nearshore factories to Mexico or reshore them to the United States, taking 
advantage of strong human capital and shorter supply chains. Bilateral trade 
dropped significantly during the recession but has since rebounded strongly, 
growing significantly faster than trade with China.8 As demonstrated in the 
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above map (Figure 2), the growth of trade adds pressure (and has the potential to 
add additional pressure) on the already strained POEs and transportation corridors.
Despite growing trade, the number of trucks crossing the border has remained 
relatively stable since the year 2000. As shown in Figure 3 above, personal 
vehicle and pedestrian traffic shows an even starker contrast, with a clear 
inflection point around the turn of the century. Several studies have attempt-
ed to quantify the costs of border area congestion to the economies of the 
United States and Mexico. In what is perhaps a testimony to the fragmented 
and geographically disperse nature of the border region, most of these stud-
ies have focused on particular North-South corridors of traffic and trade rather 
than taking a comprehensive, border-wide approach. The specific results of the 
studies (summarized in Table 2, on next page) are quite varied, and too much 
value should not be placed on any single number. Nonetheless, one message 
comes through quite clearly—long and unpredictable wait times at the POEs 
are costing the United States and Mexican economies many billions of dollars 
each year.
Figure 4: Cars Waiting in Line at the san ysidro Port of Entry
Photo by Matt H. Wade
70A Comprehensive Analysis of the U.S.-Mexico Border
Table 2: The Costs of Congestion
studies of the Costs of Border Wait Times and Congestion to  
U.s. and Mexican Economies
Region of 
Crossings
Region of 
Economic 
Impact
Wait 
Time 
(min.)
year of 
Potential 
Impact
Cost to  
Regional  
Economy  
(billions of 
Usd)
Costs in 
Jobs
source
san diego - 
Tijuana
U.S. and 
Mexico
… 2007 $7.2 62,000
SANDAG, 
2007 Update
Imperial  
Valley -  
Mexicali
U.S. and 
Mexico
… 2007 $1.4 11,600
HDR|HLB 
IVAG 2007
Tijuana Mexico 180 2007-2008 $1.9 57,000
Del Castillo 
Vera, COLEF, 
2009
Ciudad 
Juarez
Mexico 132 2007-2008 $1.5 87,600
Del Castillo 
Vera, COLEF, 
2009
nuevo Laredo Mexico 174 2007-2008 $3.7 133,800
Del Castillo 
Vera, COLEF, 
2009
nogales Mexico 66 2007-2008 $0.2 18,000
Del Castillo 
Vera, COLEF, 
2009
Us-Mexico  
Border
U.S. 63 2008 $5.8 26,000
Accenture 
Draft, March 
2008
Us-Mexico  
Border
U.S. 99 2017 $12.0 54,000
Accenture 
Draft, March 
2008
El Paso/Cd. 
Juarez
El Paso/Cd. 
Juarez
2008 
peak 
times: 
~45 - 220
2035 $54.0 850,000
Cambridge 
Systematics 
Inc., June 
2011
Note: Year of Potential Impact refers to the year in which the listed monetary and employment effects 
take place. For dates before 2009, this refers to the estimated costs for the year of the study. For 
future years, this refers to the estimated cost that will take place if the border is not made more 
efficient.
Sources: See endnote number nine for source details 
Box 1: PRInCIPAL TRUsTEd TRAVELER  
And shIPPER PRoGRAMs FoR ThE  
U.s.-MExICo BoRdER
secure Electronic network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (sEnTRI): Begun in 
1995, this program offers pre-approved pedestrians and passenger vehicles expe-
dited entry into the United States at the southwest border. To enroll, one must pay 
the $122 dollar fee and undergo a background check, fingerprinting, and interview 
with a CBP officer, demonstrating he or she is a low-risk traveler. In April 2012, 
there were 282,536 program members, up 71 percent from the 165,166 enrolled 
in 2008.i Increased membership caused the percentage of border crossings that 
they represent to grow from 9 percent in 2008 to 18 percent in 2012.ii Seventeen 
SENTRI lanes are now in place at twelve of the largest POEs along the U.S.-Mexi-
co border.
Free and secure Trade (FAsT): This trusted shipper program operates at both 
the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders, expediting the passage of enrolled 
commercial trucks into the United States. After being started in 2002, the number 
of commercial drivers enrolled in the FAST program grew to 92,604 by February 
2008 before falling to 77,999 in 2012.iii The reasons for the drop are not entirely 
clear, but the most likely explanation seems to be that drivers did not feel they 
were receiving benefits sufficient to outweigh the effort and cost of enrollment 
($50 for five years). In order for a load to receive expedited treatment along the 
southern border, in addition to having a FAST program driver, the manufacturer and 
importer must be C-TPAT certified and the load must have a security seal.iv 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT): Created in 2002 in 
“direct response to 9/11,” C-TPAT is a voluntary supply chain security program 
open to companies around the world that do business with the United States.v To 
be C-TPAT certified, a company must commit to implement a number of security 
procedures that address issues ranging from conveyance security to encouraging 
suppliers to strengthen their security. As a result of the increased level of con-
fidence that U.S. officials have in imports from C-TPAT companies, their cargo 
is four to six times less likely to undergo a security or compliance examination, 
expediting its import into the United States.vi The number of companies regis-
tered has steadily grown since C-TPAT’s creation, reaching 10,291 companies 
in 2012 (including more than 1,000 Mexican manufacturers and more than 900 
Mexican carriers).vii C-TPAT certified companies account for over fifty percent of 
all U.S. imports.viii
nuevo Esquema de Empresas Certificadas (nEEC): In December 2011, Mex-
ico announced the creation of its own supply chain security program in order 
to strengthen security while expediting the processing of members’ imports 
into Mexico. The program is reciprocal, meaning that C-TPAT certification would 
qualify a company for participation in the NEEC.ix
SourCES
i  The 2012 figure is from correspondence with Customs and Border Protection, DHS; 2008 figure from 
Customs and Border Protection, “Trusted Traveler Programs,” Department of Homelands Security, May 
23, 2008, http://www.naunewz.org/spp-docs/DHS-CBP-TrustedTraveler%280508%29_0.pdf. 
ii  ibid.
iii  The 2012 figure is from correspondence with Customs and Border Protection, DHS, 2012; 2008 figure 
from Customs and Border Protection, DHS, 2008, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/PrintMe.xml?xml=$/
content/newsroom/press_releases/2008/february/02152008.ctt&location= /newsroom/news_releases/
archives/2008_news_releases/feb_2008/02152008.xml. 
iv  Correspondence with Customs and Border Protection, DHS, 2012.
v  Customs and Border Protection, Securing the Global Supply Chain: Customs and Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism Strategic Plan, Department of Homeland Security, November 2004.
vi  Customs and Border Protection, “Customs and Trade Partnership Against Terrorism: A Guide to 
Program Benefits,” Department of Homelands Security, available at http://www.ngjensen.com/ctpat/
ProgramBenefitsGuide.pdf. 
vii  Correspondence with Customs and Border Protection, DHS, 2012.
viii  Customs and Border Protection, “C-TPAT: Program Overview,” DHS, 2011, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhan-
dler/cgov/trade/cargo_securit y/ctpat/ctpat_program_information/what_is_ctpat/ctpat_overview.ctt/
ctpat_overview.pdf
ix  U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Tony Wayne, quoted in Voice of America, “Promoting Cross-border 
Trade”, January 12, 2012, http://www.voanews.com/policy/editorials/americas/Promoting-Cross-Bor-
der-Trade--136968258.html; see also ftp://ftp2.sat.gob.mx/asistencia_servicio_ftp/publicaciones/folle-
tos11/Trip_NEEC_14122011.pdf. 
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Intelligence and Trusted Traveler Programs
Many Office of Field Operations (OFO) officers have several years of experi-
ence, allowing them to instinctively identify suspicious anomalies in an individ-
ual or vehicle. Nonetheless, they can be even more effective when additional 
information about a particular shipment or person is made available ahead of 
time or even as the individual arrives at the POE. License plate readers, for 
example, provide OFO officers with a vehicles crossing history, allowing him or 
her to identify suspect patterns and to crosscheck an individual’s declarations 
with the electronic records. In the post-NAFTA and post-9/11 world, intelligence 
has become an increasingly vital tool for safe and efficient border management 
as both the volume of bilateral commerce and threat of attack by non-state 
actors have grown.
Voluntary trusted traveler and trusted shipper programs provide Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) with intelligence needed to more accurately assess 
the risk presented by someone seeking entry to the United States (see box 1 
on the previous pages for information on the main programs). Frequent cross-
ers can enroll in these programs by providing CBP with additional documenta-
tion, undergoing background checks, and taking steps to increase supply chain 
security. In return, crossers are offered expedited processing at the borders, 
which saves them time and money and thereby incentivizes their participation 
in the programs. By speeding the passage of low-risk individuals and ship-
ments, OFO officers are able to focus more time and energy on higher-risk or 
unknown traffic. That is, by making the proverbial haystack that officers must 
sift through smaller, they increase their chances of finding the needle.
Trusted traveler and shipper programs are a win-win. They decrease wait 
times, minimize the need for additional staffing and lanes, and increase border 
security. While the programs have generally been successful, they also have a 
huge amount of untapped potential. The SENTRI trusted traveler program, for 
example, expedites the passage of 18 percent of all northbound traffic. This is 
a significantly larger percentage than in previous years, but since the majority 
of traffic is made up of frequent crossers that live in border communities, CBP 
might consider setting a goal as high as forty to fifty percent within the next 
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several years. To reach such a lofty goal, CBP would need to work with Mexi-
can local and federal authorities to extend the reach of dedicated lanes so that 
program members do not have to wait in traffic before reaching their express 
lane. The use of trusted traveler and shipper programs might also be increased 
through outreach (perhaps application fee discount coupons being handed to 
frequent crossers) and the expansion of the program to additional POEs.
The FAST program for commercial trucks appears to need particular attention. 
After seeing significant growth since its implementation in 2002, enrollment 
has actually declined since 2008 (see Figure 5, below). The full causes of this 
decline should be studied and addressed, given the potential value to security 
and the competitiveness of regional manufacturing that the FAST program 
represents. Since FAST lanes can only be used when FAST drivers are carrying 
goods from a CTPAT supplier, special attention must be paid to developing an 
incentive structure to encourage participation in both programs.
Figure 5: Trusted Traveler and shipper Programs Enrollment, 
2004-2012
Source: Customs and Border Protection, DHS10 
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Greater experimentation in the promotion and implementation of trusted trav-
eler and shipper programs (SENTRI, CTPAT, FAST, and also the use of Ready 
Lanes for those with WHTI compliant documents) would be a useful tool in 
developing best practices for improving security while facilitating commerce.
staffing Levels at the Ports of Entry
Since 9/11 and the increase in security at our land ports of entry with Mexico, 
one of the major points of contention between border communities, regional 
interest groups and Washington has concerned staffing levels and their effects 
on local economies. While the number of U.S. Border Patrol agents has more 
than doubled over the past decade, Office of Field Operations (blue-uniformed 
CBP Officers that staff the ports of entry) staffing has remained relatively 
stable (see Figure 6). In 2007, the U.S. Congress began to fund the vigilance 
of the areas between the POEs at a higher level than the POEs themselves. 
This is surprising given the increase in bilateral trade, the significant increases 
in border wait times since 9/11, and evidence that appears to suggest that the 
POEs, rather than the areas between them, are a more likely crossing point for 
drugs and dangerous individuals (see the chapter on border security). The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office has suggested that the levels of staffing and 
training for CBP Officers are each lacking.11 Border community interest groups 
often point to the remarkable increase in U.S. Border Patrol staffing, infrastruc-
ture and implementation of technology and critique the relatively little innova-
tion they see at the ports. 
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Figure 6: Border Enforcement Appropriations and  
Personnel: Comparison of Resources at and Between  
Ports of Entry, Fy2004-Fy2012
Notes: Total appropriations between the ports include US Border Patrol and Fencing, Infra-
structure, and Technology funding.
Source: Marc Rosenblum (Congressional Research Service), Testimony on Measuring Border 
Security before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland 
Security, U.S. Congress, May 8, 2012.
In addition to the important discussion on staffing levels (Rep. Sylvester Reyes’ 
PORTS Act has called for 5,000 additional staff for the land ports of entry, for 
example), consideration is merited on the nature of these important positions. 
The difficulty of the job combined with the numerous hours of overtime make 
for a truly challenging work environment for these key federal employees who 
protect border communities and the nation while facilitating U.S.-Mexico trade. 
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In response, and often as a supplement to the issue of staffing levels, some 
analysts have suggested that border security and economic competitiveness 
might be strengthened by efforts to improve job quality—and therefore retain 
talent—for CBP Officer positions.12 The expanded use of technology and the 
movement of some inspection and admittance operations to Mexico (customs 
preclearance) might also be steps in the creation of a 21st Century Border 
officer.
Customs
In much the same way as long and unpredictable wait times add costs to 
cross-border transactions, the significant documentation requirements faced 
by importers and exporters to take advantage of the tariff preferences granted 
by NAFTA actually can sometimes 
cut away at the very cost savings 
the agreement was meant to 
provide. Rules of origin stipulate 
that only products from the U.S., 
Canada or Mexico should get 
preferential treatment. Firms 
must therefore maintain detailed 
records regarding the source of 
their products, sometimes includ-
ing their parts and materials. This 
paperwork burden can be particu-
larly costly and act as a barrier to 
exporting for small and medium-sized businesses. 
In theory, the solution is a customs union (like the European Union) with com-
mon external tariffs charged to non-member countries. With no intraregional 
tariffs and no need to verify the origin of goods moving within the region, 
taking commercial goods across the U.S.-Mexico border would only require a 
basic security. In practice, however, this would be very difficult to achieve in 
North America due to the many trade agreements each country has negotiated 
and the industries each has sought to protect.
Documentation requirements 
faced by importers and exporters 
to take advantage of the tariff 
preferences granted by NAFTA 
actually can sometimes cut away 
at the very cost savings the agree-
ment was meant to provide.
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A more appropriate approach for our region may be to take things product 
by product.13 For goods that already face similar external tariffs in each of the 
NAFTA countries, negotiations could be started to have tariffs lowered to the 
lowest of the three (trade agreements make it hard for countries to raise most 
tariffs). When a common external tariff is reached for a product, it could then 
be exempted from most customs requirements at the United States’ southern 
and northern borders.
Other important efforts are underway to simplify the management of existing 
customs requirements, moving toward a process that allows the multiple cus-
toms forms to be filled out without repeating steps in one convenient online 
form. These systems are known as a “single window.” The U.S. has mostly 
implemented such a solution for imports but not exports, and Mexico has just 
launched its Ventanilla Unica, which needs ongoing development to become a 
true one-stop system for customs paperwork.
Balancing the dual Mission
Border management changed significantly after 9/11, and CBP’s primary mis-
sion is to prevent terrorists and instruments of terror from entering the United 
States. This is obviously crucial to U.S. national security. Nonetheless, on a 
daily basis CBP must facilitate commercial traffic (also part of its mission) and 
disrupt the flow of unauthorized immigrants and smuggled goods. In the best 
of cases, CBP supervisors, agents, and officers find ways to balance the need 
to protect our nation’s security and economy. As some supervisors at the POEs 
already clearly do, the role of leadership in the context of CBP’s dual mission 
is to both seek out best practices and empower officers to experiment with 
creative ways to facilitate travel and commerce while protecting the security of 
the nation. Too often the primacy of the security mission is used as a justifica-
tion for tolerating long wait times for trucks, cars, and pedestrians attempting 
to cross.  
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Port of Entry Infrastructure
One of the most obvious and often cited ways to reduce congestion at the 
POEs is to update and expand border crossing infrastructure, and credit is 
certainly due to the U.S. government and border communities for significant 
recent advances. After a decade with no new ports of entry built, three new 
crossings were opened in 2010: Anzalduas, San Luís II, and Donna-Rio Bravo.14 
In 2011, seven new lanes were opened on the World Trade Bridge, the most 
important crossing point for commercial traffic between the United States and 
Mexico. Significant expansions are also underway at San Ysidro, the most traf-
ficked crossing for individuals, and at Nogales-Mariposa. Despite these import-
ant advances, much work remains 
to be done. Average U.S. land 
POEs are more than forty years 
old, with some over seventy years 
old.15 Customs and Border Protec-
tion believes that “federal appro-
priations have not kept pace with 
needs,” noting $6 billion dollars of 
investment are needed to “fully 
modernize” the land ports of entry 
along the United States’ southern 
and northern borders.16
Given the fact that POE improve-
ments offer significant and tangi-
ble monetary benefits to border 
communities and trade-depen-
dent industries, state, local and 
private entities are often willing 
to contribute funding to border 
infrastructure projects. Under the 
current budgetary constraints, it makes sense for federal agencies to take full 
advantage of these alternative funding sources. Along the Texas-Mexico border, 
the majority of POEs are owned by the city or county in which they are located. 
The challenge is now for  
heterogeneous and  
geographically disperse  
border communities to find a 
way to speak with a common 
voice, for policymakers in 
Washington and Mexico City 
to guide strategic planning for 
regional competitiveness, and 
for all stakeholders to engage  
vigorously in binational  
dialogue and cooperation.
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This model for infrastructure investment could be expanded along other parts 
of the U.S.-Mexico border, but changes to current federal legislation appear to 
be necessary to allow CBP to “accept reimbursement from sources other than 
Congress.”17  As demonstrated above, additional staffing is and will be increas-
ingly necessary as trade increases. With the active support of border stake-
holders across the region, a proposal along these lines designed in collabora-
tion with federal agencies could likely garner legislative support and could open 
significant opportunities for investment despite tough budgetary times.
Coordination and Cooperation: Border Master Plans and the 
Interagency Process                                                                                          
Managing the U.S.-Mexico border is made particularly difficult by the large 
number of federal, state, and local government entities that manage and pro-
tect the border and surrounding transportation infrastructure.
While the State Department and Mexico’s Foreign Ministry manage most 
bilateral issues, in the case of the border they must work alongside a number 
of federal stakeholders, such as Commerce/Economía, DHS/Gobernación, 
DOT/SCT, and EPA/SEMARNAT, to name but a few. In light of border region 
complaints over the slowdown in crossborder commerce due to increased 
concerns regarding terrorism and drug-trafficking related violence, in 2010 the 
U.S. and Mexican governments reconfigured their interagency processes and 
created the bilateral Executive Steering Committee on 21st Century Border 
Management (ESC) in an effort to improve both interagency and binational 
coordination. Officials on both sides of the border cite the ESC as a major 
advance in federal-level coordination of border management.
For the United States, the National Security Staff Interagency Policy Commit-
tee sits at the nexus of the new Executive Steering Committee and three ma-
jor components, Infrastructure Planning, Port Operations, and Corridor Security. 
The increased involvement of the White House in border affairs reflects an un-
derstanding that only top-level leadership can manage the many departments 
and agencies with interests in the border.
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Figure 7: U.s. and Mexican Interagency structures Feeding into 
the Bilateral Executive steering Committee
Source: U.S. Department of State.
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A key component of how the U.S.-Mexico border functions to facilitate trade 
has to do with transportation planning. In the absence of strong and coordi-
nated planning, infrastructure investments on one side of the border or in one 
region can simply feed traffic into a bottleneck in another area. This process is 
largely managed by the Joint Working Committee on Transportation Planning 
(JWC), a binational entity chaired by the two countries’ transportation agencies 
but including representatives from many federal agencies and state depart-
ments of transportation. As border communities felt themselves increasingly 
affected by decisions made in Washington and Mexico City, their insistence on 
being included in these discussions led to the regional border master plan pro-
cess, in which state DOTs lead stakeholder discussions on border infrastruc-
ture priorities. While this process makes sense from a U.S. perspective (in the 
absence of a national transportation plan, state DOTs essentially manage and 
spend federal transportation dollars), this process is somewhat of a mismatch 
for Mexico’s more centralized political system. The system seems to work bet-
ter in certain cross-border communities than others, as is seen with California 
and Baja California’s award-winning master plan.
There is no simple answer to the complex challenge of coordinating border 
planning and management, but a few key ingredients for success can be 
identified. First, border stakeholders need to be at the table—border experts in 
Washington and Mexico City are no substitute for those living the implications 
of policy on a daily basis. Nonetheless, a strong federal role is important. Bor-
der communities often work together, but they also compete to attract federal 
resources and trade flows. The federal agencies are well placed to analyze and 
balance competing needs, especially in dialogue with border communities. 
Finally, and hopefully obviously, cross-border collaboration is vital. To strengthen 
regional competitiveness and security, we need regional coordination. 
Regional Impact of Border Management on Local Economic 
development in the U.s.-Mexico Border Region
The intense U.S.-Mexico trade flows pass through the U.S.-Mexico border 
region, a region with a complex economy that can be seen as both wealthy and 
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poor. A number of organizations—the Border Governors Conference includ-
ed among them—have often noted that the ten states together as a single 
economic entity would comprise the fourth largest economy in the world. 
Other organizations have noted that the region possesses a highly varied 
economic makeup, with San Diego/Tijuana and El Paso/Ciudad Juarez serving 
as the principal poles of wealth and other cities and particularly rural regions 
enjoying a much less prosperity. The Tijuana-based Colegio de la Frontera Norte 
and Francisco Lara of Arizona State University have developed an index that 
weighs many of the key variables that measure competitiveness. The map 
below largely confirms previous findings, and the research sets an important 
baseline to measure efforts underway to strengthen regional competitiveness. 
The research suggests the U.S. side of the border generally has more tools for 
high productivity, but the main population centers on the Mexican side tend to 
also have strong competitiveness. Efforts to further foment the development 
of infrastructure, human capital, innovation and cluster economies in the key 
twin-cities of the border region would strengthen not only the competitiveness 
of the border region but also the areas served by the trade corridors running 
through them (virtually all of the U.S. and Mexico).
Figure 8: Composite Transborder Competitiveness Index 
Source: Transborder Development Index, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte and Dr. Francisco 
Lara Valencia in collaboration with the Border Research Partnership
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While much of this chapter focuses on binational and national policy responses 
to border challenges, governors, state legislators and mayors (among others) 
are key local players in economic decision-making. Much of the border region 
is rural or made up of smaller urban areas, and economic development in these 
areas faces challenges that are often more domestic than binational in nature 
(primary and secondary education, for example). 
While a number of studies commissioned by local entities (see Table 2 on the 
various crossborder economic studies conducted by local entities) point out 
the impressive economic significance of the ports of entry, studies outlining 
the best practices for local border region decision-makers in terms of taking 
advantage of crossborder trade for local development are few and far between. 
This may be because the cities along the U.S.-Mexico border have historically 
seen themselves to be in competition with each other in terms of attracting 
business. Often, economic development in the border region is discussed in 
stark zero-sum terms (City A wanting to take some crossborder business away 
from City B, for example).
Despite the incredible diversity present throughout the U.S.-Mexico border re-
gion, many border communities face similar challenges. Communities through-
out the region are seeking to strengthen their bases of local suppliers so 
that an ever-greater portion of the value-added processes can take place (and 
therefore support jobs) locally. The development of human capital—including 
education, workforce training, and strategies to attract and retain high-skilled 
workers—is another shared challenge. Attracting talent, companies, and tour-
ists are all made more difficult by the perceptions (and sometimes realities) of 
violence in the region, and of course, communities all along the border stand to 
benefit from better infrastructure and more efficient ports of entry. All of this is 
to say that the incentives are in place for greater collaboration for economic de-
velopment not only across the border, but also from one end to the other. The 
relatively newly created U.S.-Mexico Border Mayors Association is an entity 
which will hopefully take up this unique and daunting challenge of articulating a 
border-wide vision of economic development that is rooted in the need for local 
communities to share best economic development practices.
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Conclusion: The U.s.-Mexico Border Region’s Economic health
The state of the border is dynamic. The 1990s were the decade of NAFTA 
and skyrocketing trade. The 2000s saw security concerns grow and recession 
strike. The new decade has only just begun, but the potential is there for a re-
surgence of competitiveness and regional integration. While important policies 
have recently been developed by both federal governments in their attempts 
to catch up with global economic realities and both economic and security 
developments on the ground, clearly the two nations need to intensify their 
efforts to make the U.S.-Mexico border an engine for growth. The Declaration 
of the 21st Century Border by the White House and Los Pinos has provided 
our nations with a framework for the future, breaking down the false choice 
between security and economy in border management. There are strong 
ideas—including trusted traveler and shipper programs, preclearance, customs 
harmonization, and public-private partnerships—that have enormous potential. 
The challenge is now for heterogeneous and geographically disperse border 
communities to find a way to speak with a common voice, for policymakers in 
Washington and Mexico City to guide strategic planning for regional compet-
itiveness, and for all stakeholders to engage vigorously in binational dialogue 
and cooperation.
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CHAPTER 3: THE STATE OF SECURITY 
IN THE U.S.-MExICO BORDER REGION 
Erik Lee and Eric L. olson
 
ExECUTIVE sUMMARy
Increasing Federal Investment—and Involvement—in a Complex 
Binational Region
The state of security along the U.S.-Mexico border easily ranks as one of the most 
highly charged topics of public discussion and debate in both the United States and 
Mexico during the past several years. Concerns about global terrorism, potential 
threats posed by those entering the United States illegally, and fears that skyrocket-
ing violence in Mexico might “spillover” into the United States have led to dramatic 
policy shifts and significant new investments by the U.S. to “secure” the border.   
Yet discussions about border security cannot be fully extricated from or effectively 
addressed in isolation from other policy areas such as trade and the environment.   
Diverse domestic policies and international relations all play out in some fashion at the 
border, sometimes effectively and productively, and in other instances very inefficiently.  
Ironically, many of these policies have little to do with the border per se but reflect broader 
domestic concerns regarding national security and public safety in the U.S. and Mexico. All 
of this has taken place in a context in which U.S.-Mexico bilateral relations have become 
both more collaborative and more controversial at the same time.
The unprecedented U.S. security buildup along the border post-9/11 stands out as a 
key feature of the increased federal role and is exemplified by the increase in federal 
personnel. The U.S. Border Patrol now has over 21,000 agents assigned to the vari-
ous border patrol sectors, an increase in staffing of over 500% since the early 1990’s. 
Additionally, investments in  infrastructure (fencing) and technology between the 
land ports of entry stands in stark contrast to the multi-billion dollar deficit in ports of 
entry infrastructure1 that hampers both legitimate trade and travel as well as effective 
security operations.
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north-south and East-West Asymmetries
Security asymmetries abound along the U.S.-Mexico border. As measured 
by Federal Bureau of Investigation crime statistics, U.S. border cities rank 
among the safest in the United States, and stand in stark contrast to the frag-
ile-though-improving security situation in major Mexican border cities such as 
Ciudad Juárez. The vast difference in institutional capacity (police, courts, etc.) 
is not the only explanation for the security situation on the Mexican side of the 
border.  This paper underscores the remarkable difference between the rela-
tively peaceful western end of the Mexican side of the border (which includes 
the states of Baja California and Sonora) and the four eastern states (Chihua-
hua, Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas).
Improved border management, a challenge during normal fiscal times, is 
particularly difficult in the United States’ constrained fiscal environment and 
thus requires increased attention and creative solutions.  For example, the two 
governments—in close collaboration with border communities— should focus 
their efforts on making the land ports of entry from San Diego to Brownsville 
as safe and efficient as possible to enhance both our physical and economic 
security.  
depressurizing and innovating in the border region
Security in either country does not depend solely on what happens at the 
border.  Rather, the more the two governments can push key security process-
es away from the border, the better. For example, disrupting illegal bulk cash 
transfers or firearms trafficking can be done more effectively through investiga-
tions and intelligence operations away from the border than via random vehicle 
checks at the border.  
Much work remains to be done in strengthening overall law enforcement 
capacity in both countries to challenge cross-border trafficking and criminal ac-
tivity.  For example, fully implementing justice reform and advancing police pro-
fessionalization in Mexico, as well as disrupting the organizations engaged in 
migrant smuggling, human trafficking and moving illicit substances northward 
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into the United States would be important steps forward. Interestingly, border 
states such as Chihuahua and Baja California stand out for their implementa-
tion of justice reform and are in the vanguard of this fundamental change. In 
addition, the United States needs to demonstrate greater political courage and 
creativity to fulfill its commitments to reduce the demand for illegal drugs at 
home and disrupt the flow of weapons and money that exacerbate the violence 
associated with drug trafficking.  
Additionally, progress in modernizing and professionalizing Mexico’s multiple 
police forces and improving public trust in law enforcement will be critical to 
creating a safer U.S.-Mexico border region.  There is room for much more im-
provement at all levels of law enforcement, particularly at the state and munici-
pal levels.  Achieving the delicate balance between federal and local needs, and 
economic versus security concerns, will require greater patience in the form of 
a more realistic (longer) policy implementation timeline, improved leadership, 
and creative thinking by all parties.
A framework for measuring border security: key objective and 
subjective factors
The purpose of this chapter is to begin to set a baseline for measuring border 
security between the United States and Mexico.  Our plan is to re-examine 
these issues on a semi-regular basis, making adjustments to both the method-
ology and criteria as needed.  To initiate this process, we have chosen to focus 
on four major areas to evaluate related to border security.  These include inci-
dence of terror related activity and warnings at the border; levels of violence 
on both sides of the border and an assessment of how these might be linked; 
seizures of dangerous drugs, money and firearms at the border; and efforts 
aimed at apprehensions of undocumented and unauthorized migrants.  
In addition, border security is characterized not only by objective measures 
such as the above, but also by a broad spectrum of subjective factors including 
key U.S. and Mexican government strategies and policies in response to border 
security challenges. These include efforts such as the 21st Century Border 
interagency initiative in the U.S. and Mexico and efforts to upgrade land ports 
of entry along our shared border. 
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What is needed Most? Creativity, Capacity-building,  
and Collaboration
As the economies, cultures, and destinies of both nations become increasingly 
intertwined, both federal governments, the border states and communities 
will have to find new, creative and robust ways to increase public safety in 
the U.S.-Mexico border region. The U.S. and Mexico have only recently begun 
to make real progress on a bi-national security regime that is sustainable and 
“built to last.” 
Lasting progress in U.S.-Mexico border security can only come from increased 
bilateral collaboration and independent domestic progress on key issues affect-
ing security in the United States and Mexico.  While it is important to continue 
strong federal coordination, encouraging local collaboration can also yield signif-
icant and important dividends in fighting crime affecting cross-border cities.   
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InTRodUCTIon: ThE nATIonAL sECURITy 
IMPACT oF U.s.-MExICo BoRdER sECURITy
The state of security along the U.S.-Mexico border region easily ranks as one 
of the most highly charged topics of public discussion and debate in both the 
United States and Mexico for the past several years. It is an important issue 
that involves a number of complex public policy pieces, many of which do not 
have anything to do with the border 
per se but reflect domestic concerns 
regarding national security and public 
safety in the U.S. and Mexico. In many 
ways, the border region is where these 
national policies—and stubborn on-the-
ground realities—“bump up against” 
one another in ways which are particu-
larly challenging to analyze and around 
which to build good public policy.
Both federal governments have made the border region’s security a priority 
focus, though this is particularly true in the case of the United States since 
September 11, 2001.  As the horrors perpetrated on that day began to sink in 
among the American people and U.S. policy makers, one area of immediate 
concern was the country’s borders with Canada and Mexico.  The border with 
Mexico in particular became a matter of special focus out of fear that terrorists 
might use the relatively porous Southwest border as an entry point into the 
United States to carry out further terrorist attacks against the homeland.  
With this in mind, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created by 
the U.S. Congress through the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  It represent-
ed the largest realignment of the U.S. federal government since World War II. 
Twenty-two different agencies were moved, consolidated and/or reorganized 
under the aegis of DHS, including some of the key agencies that managed 
security along the U.S. border with Mexico. These new agencies included  
Customs and Border Protection, which includes the U.S. Border Patrol, the  
Bottom line, the border secu-
rity agenda has become less 
about national security and 
terrorist threats, and more 
about public safety.
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Office of Air and Marine, and the Office of Field Operations. In addition, 
the U.S. Congress created a new unified command (Northern Command or 
NorthCom) whose primary mission is to protect the U.S. homeland from 
external attack, and provide “civil support” in response to “domestic disaster 
relief operations that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods and earthquakes.”2 
NORTHCOM’s mission also includes support for “counter-drug operations and 
managing the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass 
destruction.“3
Now, twelve years after the 9/11 tragedy, we have an important opportunity to 
look again at the issue of border security and see how the issue has evolved 
and changed in that period.  While prevention of cross border terrorist threats 
formally remains the top priority for border agents, secondary issues have 
come much more to the fore, possibly because real cross-border terrorist 
threats have not materialized, and partly because other more pressing issues 
have taken center stage – stopping cross border violence, illegal migration, and 
drug trafficking.
Bottom line, the border security agenda has become less about national  
security and terrorist threats, and more about public safety.    
A Framework for Measuring Border security: Key objective and 
subjective Factors
The purpose of this paper is to begin to set a baseline for measuring border se-
curity between the United States and Mexico.  Our plan is to re-examine these 
issues on a semi-regular basis and make adjustments to both the methodology 
and criteria as needed.  To initiate this process, we have chosen to focus on 
four major areas to evaluate related to border security.  These include incidence 
of terror related activity and warnings at the border; levels of violence on both 
sides of the border and an assessment of how these might be linked; seizures 
of dangerous drugs, money and firearms at the border; and apprehensions of 
undocumented and unauthorized migrants.
In addition, border security is characterized not only by objective measures 
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such as the above but also by a broad spectrum of subjective factors including 
key U.S. and Mexican government strategies and policies in response to border 
security challenges. These include efforts such as the 21st Century Border 
interagency efforts in the U.S. and Mexico and specifically efforts to upgrade 
land ports of entry along our shared border. More specific, national efforts 
include a broad range of rule of law efforts in Mexico, the new U.S. Border 
Patrol Strategic Plan 2012-2016 and anti-drug efforts in the United States and 
particularly Mexico.  Additionally, President Enrique Peña Nieto has begun to 
outline his government’s priorities for building public security by committing his 
government to continue institutional reforms, re-focusing on the most violent 
crimes, and committing to increased social investments in the 250 most violent 
municipalities through the National Plan for the Social Prevention of Violence and 
Crime.  And finally, we make special mention of the impact of technology in border 
security, which has seen ups and downs over the past several years but which 
promises to change how our shared border is managed in the years ahead.
Potential vs. Actual Cross-border Terror Threats 
During the months and years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the nation’s 
long and relatively porous and undefended borders, particularly the U.S.-Mexico 
border, were drawn deeply into the national conversation about national secu-
rity. Border security became part of the overall analysis and rethinking of U.S. 
national security vulnerabilities, which included transportation networks and 
other critical infrastructure security.  Ironically, the 9/11 terrorists did not enter 
the United States over the northern or southern border but entered legally on 
student or immigrant visas.4  Nevertheless, fear that U.S. borders could be 
vulnerable to terrorist incursions led to a number of important policy decisions.
Significant fortification of the border with additional staff, equipment, and infra-
structure to make access more difficult became the principal way policy-mak-
ers sought to address perceived border vulnerabilities.  Along the way, these 
concerns were conflated with a growing call for restrictive immigration policy, 
and the so-called “sealing” of the border to keep out undocumented migrants, 
criminals and to halt exploding violence in Mexico from crossing into the Unit-
ed States.  Despite these concerns, various public announcements (testimony, 
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speeches, and the like) from federal government officials in various agencies 
state a common theme: no significant terrorist threat to the United States has 
materialized in Mexico nor penetrated the U.S.-Mexico border since 2001.  The 
State Department’s annual country reports on terrorism provide clear language 
to this effect.
“There was no evidence of ties between Mexican criminal 
organizations and terrorist groups, nor that the criminal 
organizations had aims of political or territorial control, 
aside from seeking to protect and expand the impunity 
with which they conduct their criminal activity…” 
 —U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 20115
One U.S. government agency charged with keeping terrorists from crossing 
into the United States is the United States Border Patrol, a division of U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP). As its first priority, the U.S.  
Border Patrol specifically seeks to “Prevent Terrorists and Terrorist Weapons 
from Entering the United States.”  It would come as no surprise to anyone with 
a passing interest in border security that U.S. Border Patrol strategy, goals, 
objectives, and tactics are the subject of fierce public debate. Recently, the 
United States Government Accountability Office criticized the new U.S. Border 
Patrol Strategy in a report, “Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges 
in Implementation and Assessment Efforts.” As reported by GAO, the Border 
Patrol finds itself in a challenging period characterized by multiple transitions:
“Border Patrol officials stated that the 2012 Strategic Plan 
will rely on Border Patrol and federal, state, local, trib-
al, and international partners working together to use a 
risk-based approach to secure the border, and include 
the key elements  of “Information, Integration, and Rapid 
Response” to achieve objectives. These elements were 
similar to those in the 2004 Strategy and GAO’s past work 
highlighted the progress and challenges the agency faced 
obtaining information necessary for border security; inte-
grating security operations with partners; and mobilizing a 
rapid response to security threats.”7
In this context of ambiguity, institutional challenges and an overall lack of good 
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data, precise measures of terror activity in the U.S.-Mexico border region are 
difficult to come by. However, U.S. border security officials interviewed for this 
report stated that the primary terrorist-related concern at the border involve 
Aliens from Special Interest Countries (ASIC), nationals from countries that are 
either designated state sponsors of terrorism (such as Iran) or countries where 
terrorist organizations are known to operate (such as Colombia or Pakistan).  
The ASIC designation does not necessarily imply the person is a terrorist, but 
it does subject him/her to closer scrutiny by Customs and Border Protection 
officials than other aliens apprehended at or between the ports of entry.
According to information from CBP, ASIC arrests by the Border Patrol increased 
44 percent between Fiscal Year 2007, when 462 arrests were made, and Fiscal 
Year 2010, when 663 arrests were made.  During Fiscal Year 2011 the number 
of arrests dropped to 380, a 43% decline when compared to 2010, and the 
trend lines through June, 2012 were down another 32%.   The majority of 
these arrests occur on the Southwest border, including 193 reported between 
January and June 2012 (see Table 1 below).
Table 1: Arrests of Aliens from special Interest Countries  
(southwest Border), Fy2000-Fy2012
Fiscal year number of Arrests
2000 676
2001 766
2002 849
2003 807
2004 62
2005 510
2006 No data available
2007 462
2008 No data available
2009 No data available
2010 663
2011 380
2012 (January to June only) 193
Sources: Congressional Research Service (2000-2005 data);8 Internal U.S. Customs and Bor-
der Protection report, “Aliens from Special Interest Countries.” 2012.
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The data available seems to indi-
cate that ASIC reports—including 
those made on the Southwest 
border— are in decline.  The au-
thors of this report are unaware if 
any of these cases have resulted 
in specific terror-related investi-
gations, although there was one 
publicly reported case involving a 
Somali man in Texas that allegedly 
involved links to Al-Shabab.9 
Nevertheless, public statements 
provided by the U.S. intelligence 
community and the Department of 
State suggest that risks are of a potential rather than actual nature (document-
ed and verified).  In its 2011 Terrorist Threat Assessment for Mexico, the Depart-
ment of State notes that, “There was no evidence of ties between Mexican 
criminal organizations and terrorist groups, nor that the criminal organizations 
had aims of political or territorial control, aside from seeking to protect and 
expand the impunity with which they conduct their criminal activity.”10  Ac-
cording to the Department of Justice, however, “the threat of terrorism exists 
wherever criminals regularly exploit gaps in homeland security. Terrorists could 
conceivably attempt to enter the United States or smuggle weapons of mass 
destruction across the Southwest Border by utilizing routes and methods es-
tablished by drug and alien smugglers.”11 
Levels of Violence in the U.s.-Mexico Border Region: Focus on 
the U.s. side of the Border
 “The Mexican cartels have a presence in the United 
States, but we are not likely to see the level of violence 
that is plaguing Mexico spill across the US border.  We 
assess that traffickers are wary of more effective law 
Nevertheless, public statements 
provided by the U.S. intelligence 
community and the Department 
of State suggest that risks of 
terrorism along the border with 
Mexico are of a potential rather 
than actual nature (documented 
and verified).
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enforcement in the United States.  Moreover, the factor 
that drives most of the bloodshed in Mexico—competition 
for control of trafficking routes and networks of corrupt 
officials—is not widely applicable to the small retail drug 
trafficking activities on the US side of the border. “ 
Unclassified Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the House Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence. James R. Clapper, Director of 
National Intelligence, February 2, 2012    
The risks and potential for spillover violence in the United States that is con-
nected to drug trafficking and other criminal trafficking between Mexico and 
the United States has been a major concern for policy makers and for commu-
nities along the border and, indeed, across the United States.  Yet efforts to 
measure the extent to which spillover violence is occurring have been difficult. 
In general, spillover violence is understood to be the violence that occurs as 
a result of the transnational trafficking of drugs.  It can be directed at civilians, 
law enforcement officers, and other criminals or criminal organizations.
The debate about spillover violence has been divided along three lines.  Some 
local U.S. authorities claim that spillover violence is real and a serious threat 
to the safety and security of the United States.  According to a report by two 
retired U.S. generals:
Living and conducting business in a Texas border  
county is tantamount to living in a war zone in which civil 
authorities, law enforcement agencies as well as citizens 
are under attack around the clock. The Rio Grande River  
offers little solace to the echoes of gunshots and  
explosions. News of shootings, murders, kidnappings,  
beheadings, mass graves and other acts of violence  
coming across the border go far beyond any definition  
of “spillover violence.”12
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Other experts and analysts have argued that there is insufficient data to draw 
conclusions about spillover violence.  The Justice Department’s National Drug 
Intelligence Center stated in a 2011 report that, “NDIC is unable to confidently 
assess the trends in overall drug-related crime in the U.S. Southwest Border 
region.”13  It found that “Isolated instances of crimes such as kidnappings and 
home invasions robberies directed against those involved in drug trafficking are 
reported in U.S. border communities.  However, the available data are insuffi-
cient to support trend analysis – particularly an analysis of whether such crime 
is increasing.”14
Still others, including the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, have 
used Federal Bureau of Investigation crime data to show that overall crime 
along the United States side of the international boundary is lower than the na-
tional and statewide averages and that the border region has not experienced 
an increase in violent crime during the last five years.15  See Figure 1 below, 
which shows the relatively low level of violence in the major U.S. border cities.
The U.S. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) supports this view when it 
states in its 2011 report that, “Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data show 
that overall violence crime rates in the Southwestern states trended down-
ward between 2007 and mid-2010, while overall property crime rates generally 
remained stable.”
In general, then, the authors of this report have concluded that there currently 
is insufficient evidence to suggest a  pattern of  spillover violence between 
Mexico and the United States that affects the major U.S. urban centers along 
the border (see Figure 1). 
Furthermore, what the authors commonly found in interviews with citizens 
and government officials alike is evidence for a significant urban/rural split in 
perceptions of border security. That is, while the statistical evidence shows 
that the major U.S.urban border areas have witnessed stable or even falling 
crime rates for many years, a general perception of insecurity is found among 
some rural residents of the U.S. border areas. And while overall apprehension 
rates are falling in most Border Patrol sectors, some rural residents interviewed 
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by the authors reported an increase in incursions across their properties. From 
a researcher’s perspective it is difficult to compare this anecdotal evidence 
to U.S. Border Patrol apprehension statistics—one of the principal statistical 
underpinnings of border security analysis—which are reported at the sector 
level, a level of aggregation that may miss trends in the apprehension statistics 
on a station level, a smaller unit of analysis with data that is not made available 
to the public. Thus microregional trends may not be reflected in overall trends 
captured by the publicly available federal statistics.
Figure 1: Violence in Major U.s. Border Cities 
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Report, “Offenses Reported to Law Enforcement by City 100,000 
and over in population,” 2011.
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particular, the two largest Mexican border cities, Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez, 
both experienced major spikes in violence beginning in 2006 (Tijuana) and 2009 
(Ciudad Juárez). Figure 2 below shows a spike in homicides in Ciudad Juárez 
during 2011. It was statistics such as these that captured headlines around the 
world, particularly after horrific crimes such as the mass homicide of 15 young 
people in Ciudad Juárez in January 2010.
More recently, first Tijuana then Ciudad Juárez saw homicide rates decline 
from their historic highs as conflicts between criminal organizations have 
been resolved and local and federal governments have invested massively in 
law enforcement and social programs.  Nevertheless, government data also 
suggests some of the violence has been displaced farther east and south, and 
new conflicts have erupted between criminal organizations.  In any case, the 
nature, intensity and frequency of the violence in key Mexican border cities 
had a major impact on quality of life for citizens in those communities and 
were the subject of fierce debate in Mexico and the United States. It continues 
to have an impact on public policy thinking at the highest levels in both countries. 
Ciudad Juárez is of continued interest to policymakers and citizens alike. 
Figure 2: homicides in Mexico Border Region Cities, 2012
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Source: Cory Molzahn, Octavio Rodriguez Ferreira, and David A. Shirk, Drug Violence in 
Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2012, San Diego: University of San Diego, Trans-Bor-
der Institute, February 2013, http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/130206-
dvm-2013-final.pdf. 
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More than any other sister cities along the U.S.-Mexico border, El Paso, Texas 
and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua typify the stunning and puzzling asymmetries 
in security between the United States and Mexico. While crime statistics 
underscore the very low homicide rate in El Paso (a total of 16 in 2011 
according to the FBI), Ciudad Juárez has suffered greatly from the competition 
and violence between Mexican criminal organizations in terms of its high 
homicide rate as well as spectacular crimes that have repeatedly put it in the 
global spotlight. The city’s problems stem from a complex web of local and 
transnational criminal actors as well as local, state and federal governance 
challenges that are beyond the scope of this paper.
A combination of federal, state and local governmental and civil society efforts 
have served to reduce various measures of criminality in Ciudad Juárez over 
the past several months. These efforts—in addition to ever-changing balances 
of power between criminal organizations—have resulted in a general reduction 
in crimes such as homicide, aggravated automobile theft (carjacking), and 
extortion, among others. In Figure 3 below, we see an overall downward 
trend in one of the most closely watched crime indicators for Ciudad Juárez: 
homicides.
Figure 3: homicide Rate in Ciudad Juárez, January 2010-January 2013
Source: Mesa de Seguridad de Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua. http://www.mesadeseguridad.org
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As the principal causes of falling U.S. crime rates since the 1990s are the 
subject of considerable debate among law enforcement analysts in the United 
States, the same is true of Mexico. Falling homicides in Ciudad Juárez are 
variously ascribed to government efforts or reassertion of control over the city 
by the relevant organized crime groups. Local stakeholders in Ciudad Juárez 
interviewed for this working paper repeatedly cited increased cooperation 
between the various levels of government. Particular emphasis was given to 
the ways in which President Felipe Calderón and Chihuahua Governor César 
Duarte—hailing from the PAN and PRI, respectively—were able to join efforts 
under the Todos Somos Juárez framework for rebuilding civil society and 
enhancing public safety.
seizures of dangerous drugs, Money and Firearms at the Border
Another key indicator used by government agencies to document progress on 
combatting dangerous flows of drugs, firearms or money that funds illicit ac-
tivities are seizures of these items. According to testimony by representatives 
from U.S. Customs and Border Protection before the House Committee on 
Homeland Security on April 17, 2012, “DHS seized 74 percent more currency, 
41 percent more drugs, and 159 percent more weapons along the southwest 
border as compared to FY 2006-2008.” Their assessment was offered as evi-
dence of the agency’s approach to border security.16
Yet, despite these impressive numbers, seizures at the border have proven 
to be an unreliable measure of effectiveness in stanching the flow of drugs, 
money and firearms.  For one, it’s difficult to determine the relative importance 
of the reported seizure amounts since these are generally reported as gross 
amounts with no explanation of what percentage of the total amount trafficked 
these seizures represent.   For example, seizures of cocaine were over 18,000 
kilos in 2010 yet it is difficult to know what percentage this represents of total 
cocaine entering the United States.  Furthermore, making year-to-year compar-
isons to determine whether the percentages seized are increasing or decreas-
ing is also very difficult to determine.  Seizures may increase or decrease in 
total volume, but it’s less clear if the increase in volume seized also represents 
a similar percentage increase.    
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Even when using the most generous, albeit questionable, government es-
timates of total illicit traffic, seizures would appear to represent a very tiny 
percentage of the estimated number or volume of the illegal items passing 
through the border.  Given the extraordinary resources – personnel, technology, 
and finances – deployed at the border one has to ask whether the cost-benefit 
ratio justifies additional investments to simply catch a miniscule percentage of 
illegal money, firearms or drugs crossing the border.  Put another way, does it 
make sense to invest an additional million dollars for more inspections if one 
can reasonably expect to recoup a small fraction of that investment in addition-
al seizures?  Ultimately, the question is whether the border is the best place 
to stop these illegal flows or whether a strategic enforcement approach away 
from the border is more rational and cost-effective.
The following summarizes information that is publically available about seizures 
of illegal drugs, firearms and bulk cash at or near the border.  As can be ob-
served, much of the information is fragmented between governmental agen-
cies and specific information about seizures at the border is often unavailable 
or not disaggregated by the government of either country.
Illegal drug seizures
As the chart below indicates, cocaine seizures have decreased over the last 
five years although there has been a gradual uptick in the past two years.  By 
contrast, heroin and marijuana seizures have been increasing steadily during 
this period, and a dramatic increase in methamphetamine seizures was report-
ed, growing by 55.55% from 2,918 kilograms to 5,253 kilograms in five years.  
This may reflect the Mexican cartels’ increasing involvement in the metham-
phetamine trade and the drug’s increasing popularity among consumers.  The 
UNODC 2012 Drug Report notes that, “North America accounted for roughly 
half of global methamphetamine seizures in 2010, reporting 22 tons of seized 
methamphetamine.  The biggest increase was reported in Mexico where 
seizures doubled from 6 tons in 2009 to almost 13 tons in 2010, but metham-
phetamine seizures also rose significantly in the United States from 7.5 to 8.7 
tons in that period.”17 
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Table2. U.s. Illegal drug seizures Along the southwest Border
(in kilograms)18
Cy2005 Cy2006 Cy2007 Cy2008 Cy2009 Cy2010
Cocaine 22,653 28,284 22,656 16,755 17,583 18,623
heroin 228 489 404 556 839 1,062
Marijuana 1,034,102 1,146,687 1,472,536 1,253,054 1,859,258 1,718,424
Methamphetamine 2,918 2,798 1,860 2,201 3,788 5,253
Total 1,059,924 1,178,274 1,497,495 1,272,658 1,881,548 1,743,421
Source: CY2005 – CY2008 data are from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelli-
gence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, Product No. 2010-Q0317-001, February 
2010, p.20, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/38661p.pdf. The NDIC uses data from 
the National Seizure System. CY2009 and CY2010 data were provided to CRS by the NDIC.
The National Drug Intelligence Center reported in 2011 that most drugs are 
seized along the Southwest border.  To be specific, they found that in 2010, 
96% of marijuana, 80% of methamphetamine, 64% of heroin and 58% of 
cocaine seizures took place in this region.19    
Money
Although stemming the flow of cash across the Southwest border is one of the 
key elements of the White House’s National Southwest Border Counter-nar-
cotics Strategy, it is believed that less than .20% of illicit cash that crosses the 
border is actually seized. If one starts with the U.S. government’s 2010 esti-
mates of the amount of money being laundered back to Mexico and Colombia 
(between 19 and 29 billion) and then takes the estimates for cash seizures in 
the U.S. ($32.4 million)20 and Mexico ($7 million)21 from 2010, which was $39.4 
million, then one can see how less than .20% was seized; this is using the 
lower estimate of how much money is being laundered into Mexico.  If one 
accepts the government’s estimate that as much as half is being returned as 
bulk cash then .37% of the cash was seized in 2010.
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The official numbers are suspect and the amount of bulk cash seizures at the 
border are difficult to determine since there is no single agency that aggre-
gates the data on these seizures.22 Instead, there are a number of reports that 
provide data on overall seizures but do not specify where these occurred.  It is 
only an assumption, maybe reasonable, that these seizures mostly took place 
along the Southwest border.  For example, according to the 2011 National Drug 
Intelligence Center Report, bulk cash seizures in the U.S.  totaled $798 million 
from January 2008 through August 2010, an average of approximately $25 
million per month.  The same report states that these seizures were predomi-
nantly in the border states of Texas, California, Arizona, New Mexico, or actually 
occurred in Mexico.   Likewise, according to a 2010 Washington Post article, 
the Department of Homeland Security seized $85 million along the southwest 
border in 2009.23 ICE also implemented an initiative along the border called 
Operation Firewall which specifically tries to halt the flow of cash into Mexico; 
according to a statement by James Dinkins, the Executive Associate Director 
of Homeland Security Investigations to the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security, the Operation enabled ICE to seize more than $504 million between 
2005 and 2009.24
In each of these cases it is impossible to draw specific conclusions about 
where the seizures are taking place although it seems reasonable to assume 
that the majority are happening in the border region.  More importantly, 
however, may be the conclusion that the amount of bulk cash being seized is 
quite small even when one starts with the low end of the government’s own 
estimates of the total volume.  
Firearms
One hears often that American guns are contributing the cartel-related violence 
in Mexico, but actually tracing the firearms and where they enter Mexico, not 
to mention stopping them before this occurs, is very difficult.  As is shown in 
Figure 4 below, up to 65.5% (taking the 2008 high) of the firearms recovered 
by Mexican security and law enforcement and then traced are U.S. sourced.  
Some are manufactured and sold in the United States and others are first im-
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ported to the United States, eventually making their way into Mexico.   
Additionally, the majority of firearms enter Mexico illegally through five  
southwest border ports of entry, namely, San Diego, Nogales, El Paso,  
Laredo and McAllen;25 and 69% of traced firearms were originally purchased  
in Texas, California and Arizona.26 
Figure 4: U.s. sourced Firearms Recovered in Mexico, 2007-2011 
Source:  U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “ATF 
Mexico: Calendar Years 2007-2011,” Report #123876, https://www.atf.gov/files/statistics/down-
load/trace-data/international/2007-2011-Mexico-trace-data.pdf. 
How many weapons are specifically seized at the border, as is the case with 
cash, is enormously difficult to determine because various agencies are involved 
in these seizures including local law enforcement, the ATF, CBP and occasionally 
ICE in the U.S.;  as well as the Mexican military, Attorney General’s office, and 
state authorities.  The information available is mostly from individual U.S. gov-
ernment agencies; there is no consolidated data, and there are no reports from 
Mexico on border seizures.   
The information on firearm seizures at the border is mostly fragmented and 
often not specific to the border.  The ATF reports that since the beginning of 
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Project Gunrunner, an operation along the southwest border which specifically 
targets weapons trafficking into Mexico that began in 2006, they have seized, 
“over 10,000 firearms and nearly one million rounds of ammunition destined for 
Mexico.”27 In 2009, at a DHS and ATF summit, officials revealed that between 
July and September 2009, CBP and ICE seized 65% more weapons along 
the border than in the same period the previous year, and that in the last 6 
months of fiscal year 2009 they seized more than 50% more than in the last 
six months of fiscal year 2008.28 
As with illegal drugs and bulk cash, it has been impossible to develop a com-
prehensive picture of firearm seizures at the border by either Mexican or U.S. 
authorities.
Increased Efforts Aimed at Apprehensions of Undocumented 
and Unauthorized Migrants: new staffing,  
Infrastructure and Technology
The U.S.-Mexico border region is an enormous 
geographical space, with the international 
boundary extending 1,954 miles –much of it in 
extremely remote desert and mountainous ter-
rain. It is a challenging space for the two nations 
to manage. 
In the U.S. a large number of federal agencies 
have a say in border security affairs, though his-
torically it is the U.S. Border Patrol that has had 
the highest public profile in security matters on 
the border.29  The Border Patrol’s actions drive a 
large portion of the public discussion on border 
security. Its focus on staffing, infrastructure and 
technology has significantly shaped what the 
border looks like today. For these reasons it is worthwhile to spend a signifi-
cant amount of time examining the U.S. Border Patrol. 
Ultimately, the question 
is whether the border 
is the best place to 
stop these illegal flows 
or whether a strategic 
enforcement approach 
away from the border 
is more rational and 
cost-effective.
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staffing
As the profile of the U.S. Border Patrol has expanded, so, too, has its funding 
and particularly its staffing. As seen in Figure 5 below, Border Patrol staffing 
has undergone a significant increase since the early 1990s. From fiscal year 
1992 to fiscal year 2011, staffing expanded by 17,305 agents, a 518 percent 
increase over two decades. The increase was given particular emphasis during 
the FY2007-FY2011 period, when two major trends came together to prompt 
Congress to increase staffing between the ports of entry. These include the 
failure of comprehensive immigration reform in the U.S. Congress as well as 
increasing violence in Mexican border cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez 
as one of the byproducts of stepped-up pressure on transnational criminal 
organizations by President Felipe Calderon’s administration beginning in 
December 2006.
Figure 5: U.s. Border Patrol staffing, Fiscal years 1992- 2011
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/bor-
der_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/usbp_fy12_stats/staffing_1993_2012.ctt/staff-
ing_1993_2012.pdf.  
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As staffing has peaked, we have discovered something unexpected: as mea-
sured by apprehension statistics, unauthorized immigration is way down from 
its peak in a number of the Southwest border sectors. A number of research-
ers, including Douglas Massey 
of the Mexican Migration Project 
at Princeton, have argued that 
Mexican migration to the U.S. is 
now at net zero, that is, roughly 
the same numbers of Mexicans 
are returning to Mexico as are 
entering the United States. Vari-
ous reasons have been given for 
this largely unexpected devel-
opment, including a weak U.S. 
economy, a relatively strong 
Mexican economy, enhanced border deterrence and increasingly dangerous 
conditions for migrants in key corridors.
This is demonstrated by the fact that U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions in FY 
2012 were down in a number of key sectors from even the low standards of 
2011. To take one example, as is seen below in Table 3, during FY2012 in the 
El Paso sector there were only 9,678 apprehensions, down from a peak of 
285,781 in 1993. San Diego apprehensions in FY12 were at 28,461, down from 
their peak of 565,581 in FY92. And perhaps most remarkably, Tucson Sector ap-
prehensions FY12 were down to 120,000 from a peak of 616,346 in FY 2000. 
While it is difficult to predict future 
flows of migrants, we seem to be 
at or past a point of diminishing 
returns in terms of improving 
border security through increases 
in Border Patrol staffing.
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Table 3: U.s. Border Patrol Apprehensions for southwest Border 
Patrol sectors, Fy 2011 and Fy 2012
sector staffing
Fy 2011 
Apprehensions
Fy 2012  
Apprehensions
Peak  
Apprehensions 
1992-2011/year
Big Bend 667 4,036 3,964 15,486 (1998)
Del Rio 1,626 16,144 21,720 157,178 (2000)
El Centro 1,164 30,191 23,916 238,126 (2000)
El Paso 2,738 10,345 9,678 285,781 (1993)
Laredo 1,871 36,053 44,872 141,893 (1997)
Rio Grande 
Valley
2,504 59,243 97,762 243,793 (1997)
San Diego 2,669 42,447 28,461 565,581 (1992)
Tucson 4,239 123,285 120,000 616,346 (2000)
Yuma 969 5,833 6,500 138,438 (2005)
Sources:  United States Border Patrol Apprehensions / Seizure Statistics - Fiscal Year 2011, 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/fy_pro-
file_2011.ctt/fy_profile_2011.pdf and United States Border Patrol Southwest Border Sectors 
Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions By Fiscal Year, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_
security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/usbp_fy12_stats/appr_swb.ctt/appr_swb.pdf. 
While it is difficult to predict future flows of migrants, overall we seem to be at 
or past a point of diminishing returns in terms of Border Patrol staffing. This is 
significant because of the enormous expenditures to increase staffing for the 
U.S. Border Patrol over the past twenty years as is demonstrated in Figure 6 
above and the emphasis during this period on securing the areas between the 
land ports of entry (which is the specific jurisdiction of the Border Patrol). 
Infrastructure
The construction of infrastructure between the Ports of Entry (POE) along 
the U.S.-Mexican border has been an uneven process and tends to happen in 
bursts of activity in reaction to a perceived need for greater border security. 
Operation Gatekeeper and Operation Hold the Line were implemented by the 
Clinton Administration in the San Diego and El Paso regions respectively in the 
mid-1990s partly in response to local concerns over illegal immigration. These 
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programs began a new era of security infrastructure along the border which 
was characterized by reinforced fencing, increased lighting and use of various 
types of sensors to detect and deter illegal crossing between the ports of 
entry. Figure 5 below shows the dramatic increase in fence building that corre-
sponds with the increase in staffing beginning in 2007.
Figure 6. Total Miles of Border Fencing, 1993-2012
Source: Marc R. Rosenblum testimony, “Measuring Border Security: U.S. Border Patrol’s New 
Strategic Plan and the Path Forward,” Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Border and Maritime Security, May 8, 2012.
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TRUsTEd shIPPER And TRAVELER PRoGRAMs:  
PART oF ThE AnsWER To shAREd sECURITy And  
EConoMIC GRoWTh In ThE BoRdER REGIon
Moderate investments to update infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of entry 
are certainly needed, as long lines and overworked staff promote neither efficiency 
nor security. But in a time of tight federal budgets, asking for more resources can-
not be the only answer. Strategic efforts that do more with less, improving efficien-
cy and reducing congestion, are also needed. Trusted traveler and shipper programs 
(SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT) allow vetted, low-risk individuals and shipments expedited 
passage across the border. Improving these programs and significantly expanding 
enrollment could increase throughput with minimal investments in infrastructure 
and staffing—all while strengthening security by giving border officials more time to 
focus on unknown and potentially dangerous individuals and shipments.
—Erik Lee and Christopher Wilson, “The State of Trade, Competitiveness and Economic 
Well-Being in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region” 
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strengths and Weaknesses of the U.s.-Mexico Land  
Ports of Entry
The chapter in this report on trade, competitiveness and economic well-be-
ing in the U.S.-Mexico border region laid out the principal challenges facing 
U.S.-Mexico land ports of entry, which function both to facilitate commerce 
between the two nations but also as security “membranes” (keeping out what 
we don’t want but allowing and hopefully facilitating legitimate trade and trav-
el). These challenges include aging infrastructure, little to no funding to improve 
existing infrastructure and add needed infrastructure, and trusted travel and 
shipper programs that need to grow significantly to improve both security and 
trade. On the U.S. side of the border, the land ports of entry are under the juris-
diction of the Office of Field Operations, which evolved from the U.S. Customs 
Service as it was absorbed into Customs and Border Protection under the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.
The Impact of Technology on Border security
As discussed above, infrastructure and staffing levels along the border have 
increased dramatically in the last decade.  The U.S. federal government in par-
ticular has made significant investments in technology in the hopes of enhanc-
ing its results, gaining a significant return on investment and defending the 
United States from all threats. And much the same as we have seen with the 
border security areas discussed above, the public discussion over the what, 
where, why and how of technological investment is the subject of fierce de-
bate. In general, though, the premise—that technology, which has proven such 
a game-changer in other areas of modern life, should also return value in border 
security—is a solid one. Additional developments in this area promise to be 
of great interest to observers of border security. Of additional interest is how 
additional technology can be folded into tightening federal budgets—particular-
ly in the United States—and whether falling apprehensions of undocumented 
migrants at the border will justify additional investment in this area.
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Conclusion 
The state of security in the U.S-Mexico border region is one of asymmetry, 
transition, and ambiguity. Without a doubt, the U.S. and Mexican federal 
governments have made large investments in staffing, infrastructure and 
technology and have reorganized and refocused efforts to respond to 
specific threats and events. Yet gains in areas such as apprehensions of 
undocumented migrants and reductions in violence in key cities such as 
Ciudad Juárez seem tenuous at best and beg for more comprehensive, 
creative and collaborative solutions between these two countries, one a 
superpower and the other a key emerging power.
What’s needed Most: Creativity, Capacity-building,  
and Collaboration
As the two nations become more intertwined economically and peo-
ple-to-people ties  become more intense, the federal governments, the 
border states and communities will have to find new, creative and robust 
ways to increase public safety in the U.S.-Mexico border region. This will 
require both greater capacity at the state and local level as well as greater 
creativity, a more realistic, longer timeframe for policy implementation 
and leadership at the federal level. Although both countries have recently 
achieved new levels of collaboration—codified into official policy with the 
remarkable May 19, 2010 Joint Declaration on Twenty First Century Border 
Management by President Barack Obama and President Felipe Calderón—
the U.S. and Mexico have only recently begun to make real progress on a 
binational security regime that would be “built to last.” 
Lasting progress in U.S.-Mexico border security can only come from 
both increased bilateral collaboration as well as independent domestic 
progress on key issues affecting security by the U.S. and Mexican pub-
lics. One key collaborative objective that needs increased attention and 
creative solutions is border management, particularly in the context of an 
extremely constrained fiscal environment in the United States. The two 
governments—in close collaboration with border communities—must use 
all current and additional creative means at their disposal to make the land 
ports of entry from San Diego/Tijuana to Brownsville/Matamoros as safe 
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and efficient as possible to enhance both our physical and economic security. 
There have been remarkable experiments in implementing already existing 
technology, particularly between the ports of entry with highly controversial 
initiatives such as SBInet. Yet the governments have yet to employ this technol-
ogy in a game-changing way to make the land ports of entry true platforms for 
economic security rather than highly congested and bureaucratized nodes in 
our North American commercial network.
depressurizing and Innovating in the Border Region
In general, the more the two governments can push key security processes 
away from the border, the better, as an overconcentration of resources at the 
border (and particularly between the ports of entry) has the potential to distract 
from a more strategic distribution of security resources throughout the U.S., 
Mexico and beyond. There remains much work to do in this area, but several 
key challenges stand out, including enhancing intelligence sharing between the 
U.S. and Mexico, implementing justice reform in Mexico, disrupting the flow of 
firearms and bulk cash southward into Mexico as well as the flow of migrants, 
victims of human trafficking and illicit substances northward into the United 
States. 
Enhanced collaboration on implementing Mexico’s justice reform —the shift to 
an effective oral adversarial system of justice— and professionalizing Mexico’s 
multiple law enforcement agencies should be top priorities for  promoting  
better security in the border region. Likewise, the United States needs to 
demonstrate much greater progress in reducing illegal drug consumption at 
home by identifying and funding effective prevention and treatment programs.  
Moreover, the politically sensitive issues of disrupting firearms trafficking from 
the United States to Mexico and disrupting money laundering schemes within 
the U.S. financial system must also be a greater priority if collaboration is to be-
come a two-way street.  Together, these challenges will require innovation and 
creativity amongst policymakers to ensure that the many competing interests 
and concerns that affect the border do not result in a region locked in inefficien-
cy but one that can reach the potential dynamism that it rightfully represents.  
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ExECUTIVE sUMMARy
Within the overall U.S.-Mexico relationship, addressing border environmental issues 
is not the highest priority for the two federal governments. The framework for coop-
eration is relatively new—only 30 years old in 2013—and has focused on reacting to 
pollution-centered crises rather than natural resource management or sustainability. 
The two countries engage in cooperation through either a centralized format, such as 
the International Boundary and Water Commission; a decentralized format, i.e., the 
La Paz Agreement, or binational institutions such as the Border Environmental Coop-
eration Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADBank), 
but often seem to underutilize all three on critical matters such as the disruptive 
effects of the border wall. 
This chapter of the State of the Border Report focuses on the evolving nature of 
U.S.-Mexico cooperation regarding the environment, and argues for the need to shift 
the emphasis from pollution control to more comprehensive natural resource man-
agement. Ultimately, we believe that it is imperative that both nations reconsider the 
importance of the region’s sustainability as part of its quest to promote our shared 
competitiveness and security. In that regard, we recommend that state and local gov-
ernments adopt a more proactive, visionary and holistic, and less reactive approach 
to environmental management, similar to the vision expressed by decision makers 
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of the Ten Border states while compiling the Strategic Guidelines document in 
2009.1
Water conservation must be implemented as part of a regional water manage-
ment strategy to reduce dependency and the energy needed to import water 
from outside natural water basins and to provide for environmental flows for 
ecosystem enhancement. States and municipalities must engage in fulfilling 
the region’s enormous potential for generating renewable energy, its “natural 
mandate” given its geographical, socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions, 
and live up to its potential for competitive and sustainable development. 
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sUsTAInABILITy
Introduction
The concern of both nations over environmental quality at their common border 
is relatively new, relatively low on the list of priorities of both capital cities, and 
ostensibly reactive. In comparison with the framework for managing shared 
U.S.-Mexico water resources, which has been in existence for over a century, 
joint efforts to control environmental pollution are less than 30 years old, and 
research and analysis on the region’s sustainability are in their infancy. In the 
years following the United States-Mexico Environmental Cooperation Agree-
ment, also known as the La Paz Agreement,2  which was the first U.S.-Mexico 
environmental cooperation framework signed by the two countries, successive 
border environmental programs were created to address pollution problems 
along the border. But funding for border projects competes for scarce resourc-
es against other national priorities on both sides of the border, as evidenced by 
the shrinking funds in the Border Environment Infrastructure Fund, which saw 
appropriations from the U.S. Congress drop from a high of one hundred million 
dollars per year in the mid-Nineties to levels of less than twenty million by 
2008.3   The long term stability of U.S. funding for border affairs remains highly 
susceptible to the political priorities of Congress and/or the White House.  
Despite these shrinking resources, there is growing recognition that sustain-
ability cannot be disassociated from security, quality of life, or economic devel-
opment. Indeed, sustainability of the environment provides the basis for quality 
of life in terms of health, jobs, and sustainable security.  Throughout the three 
decades of bilateral cooperation on environmental quality, issues and priorities 
along the border have evolved. A deficient water and sewerage infrastructure 
is no longer the main cause of pollution along the border, nor is pollution, per 
se, the environmental issue of greatest concern for both governments. In the 
1980s, cross-border pollution had become a liability in U.S.-Mexico relations. It 
was problematic in San Diego, as sewage from Tijuana overflowed into the  
sensitive Tijuana River Estuarine Reserve on the U.S. side; it was an issue 
in the Arizona-Sonora area, as the copper smelters in Douglas, Arizona and 
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Nacozari, Sonora polluted common regional air quality with sulfur dioxide; and 
it was an issue in Tecate, B.C. and Matamoros, Tamaulipas when hazardous 
waste from U.S. firms began appearing illegally in Mexican rural areas. But 
successive U.S.-Mexico environmental programs4  under the La Paz Agreement 
provided joint interventions by both federal governments, strengthened by 
state government investments in the latest multi-year program, building great-
er knowledge and capacity to control pollution at the border.
Additionally, as part of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
two countries agreed to create the Border Environment Cooperation Commis-
sion (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADB) to help build 
up the necessary infrastructure to mitigate the environmental impacts of their 
increased cross-border trade. 
Over time, population growth and economic expansion have become an 
increasing source of pressure on natural resources in the region, such as clean 
water, aquatic ecosystems, and wildlife habitat.  Water scarcity and riparian 
habitat have become a main concern in the Colorado River and the Rio Grande 
watersheds, and climate variability and weather extremes are demanding inno-
vative approaches and newer agreements in order to stave off a looming crisis. 
At the same time, security concerns after 9/11, as well as the political need to 
control immigration, made it imperative for the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security to build infrastructure including a nearly 700 mile-long physical barrier 
that includes a steel wall and up to two vehicle roads along the international 
boundary line. The barrier affects the immediate hydrology of the area and 
impedes the free flow of wildlife species, some of them endangered, while 
curtailing their habitat.5  Furthermore, the border fence encroaches on environ-
mentally sensitive areas in several stretches of the international border, such as 
the Tijuana River Estuarine Reserve and the El Pinacate and the Gran Desierto 
de Altar Biosphere Reserve in the Arizona-Sonoran Desert. 
The previous description implies a shift in the importance of matters from  
pollution control to natural resource conservation and is the product of two  
paradoxical opposites: generous investment in water and sewer infrastructure 
for cities, with relative disregard for natural resource conservation in less  
populated rural and wildness areas along the border. 
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This chapter addresses issues of environmental quality, ecological integrity and 
equity along the border, with considerations for the sustainability of the region 
as a whole. We look at the institutional framework created by both federal 
government agencies responsible for carrying out the La Paz Agreement, 
Mexico’s Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources (Semarnat) and the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), and describe the general state 
of the environment in the region focusing on each of the elements (natural re-
sources, energy, water, air, and waste) that contribute to healthy or hazardous 
landscape. The chapter concludes by reviewing the challenges to sustainability 
that the region must face, as well as suggesting measures of progress that can 
contribute to improving the overall quality of life for border residents. 
sustainability: Vision
The definition of sustainability that we have used in the development of this 
paper is one we believe takes into consideration the U.S.-Mexico border 
region, its past conditions and current situation, which is unique because of its 
particular geographical, social and ecological characteristics.
Sustainability is loosely defined as actions and projects today that do not jeopar-
dize the ability of future generations to meet their aspirations. As a more rigorous 
definition within this chapter, we suggest sustainability has equally important 
components of social equity among people and across generations; ecological 
integrity and environmental quality; and economic opportunity and access to the 
resources that enable an equilibrated development. We also consider it important 
to apply this concept of sustainability to a region’s development, regardless of 
the political divisions and cultural differences. This is because geopolitical maps 
almost never coincide with ecological regions or environmental macro divisions. 
The environment of the border region (Figure 1) is but one complex system 
(hydrological, ecological, atmospheric, climatic, energetic, etc.), which is, at the 
same time, a system intertwined with a broader socioeconomic system com-
prising industries and development areas (such as manufacturing, transportation, 
etc.). Managing to the triple bottom line formed by ecological integrity, environ-
mental quality, and equal access to quality of life and environmental health is 
confounded at every turn by the other border functions. 
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Figure 1. The U.s.-Mexico Transborder Region.
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shared by stakeholders in the transborder region in order to form a shared 
vision of sustainability. Results from a survey applied in 2009 to residents and 
stakeholders of the 10 US-Mexico border states (local and federal levels, and 
from the governmental, academic, private and social sectors)6  shows that the 
elements that were shared by them to form such a common vision of sustain-
ability were the following:
In general, the survey respondents agreed upon a vision of sustainability as a 
way to meet today’s needs in a socially equitable fashion without harming the 
ability of future generations to manage their own needs in the same way.
Regarding water conservation, the common future envisioned was one where 
the communities in the region will be mindful of the water-limited conditions, 
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Source: Border Governors Conference,  Stratetgic Guidelines for the Competitive and Sustain-
able Development of the U.S.-Mexico Transborder Region (El Colegio de la Frontera Norte and 
the Woodrow Wilson Center Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute: Washington, 2009). 
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adopt effective water conservation programs, and ensure equal access to clean 
water for everyone.
In terms of enforcement and compliance, respondents stated that they wanted 
a region where environmental authorities will rigorously and systematically 
apply environmental regulation and full compliance will become the norm in 
the region.
For climate change action, the vision that emerged from the respondents was 
of a binational action plan to increase energy efficiency and foster the use of 
renewable energy. For comprehensive ecosystem management, the region 
will develop and implement binational mechanisms to manage cross-border 
ecosystems.
The Evolving nature of U.s.-Mexico Environmental Cooperation
During the 1980s, Mexico created its first environmental regulations7 and 
began opening up to international trade and strengthening institutions and 
evolving from its status as a developing nation to an emerging economy. 
While asymmetries in wages and municipal capacity still exist between the 
two nations, Mexico today is much better equipped to monitor and enforce 
regulations than it was a generation ago. The trends and general direction of 
environmental policies are strikingly similar, and the difference in environmen-
tal regulations, management and enforcement between United States and 
Mexico could be described principally as a difference in capacity. For example, 
the U.S. and Mexico have very similar air quality standards both for emissions 
and for ambient quality but different ability to monitor, enforce, prosecute, and 
penalize offenders.  While U.S. decision making operates under federalism, 
with environmental policy tending to be fragmented, the Mexican system, 
while also a type of federalism, is more centralized, which means much of the 
influence comes from the national capital, with fewer resources made available 
to the state and local level. 
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In general, the U.S. and Mexico have settled into a three-path approach to envi-
ronmental cooperation: centralized  collaboration,  which they exercise through 
their respective foreign ministries, and in the case of the border, the Interna-
tional Boundary and Water Commission; decentralized collaboration, which in 
essence is the La Paz Agreement that enables the environmental ministries 
with a minor foreign policy impact; and the binational institutions, namely 
BECC and the NADBank. All three paths to cooperation are present as the U.S. 
and Mexico manage the environmental borderlands, yet Córdova and de la Parra 
argue that all three are underutilized and are tested under contentious  
circumstances.8
In that sense, part and parcel of the 
success achieved so far by successive 
U.S.-Mexico environmental programs 
has been recognizing these cross-border 
differences in the approach to funding 
and decision-making. As Mexican states 
have grown in political autonomy, the 
binational framework at the border has 
seen a shift in the level of responsibility 
assumed by states.  The increased level 
of participation by the states was also 
facilitated in 2003 when the binational 
Border 2012 program included the ten border states as formal stakeholders to 
act as co-chairs in each and every one of the program’s four Regional Work-
groups. These workgroups became the basic on-the-ground unit for deci-
sion-making in each of the four regions (California-Baja California, Arizona-So-
nora, New Mexico-Chihuahua, and Texas-Chihuahua/Coahuila/Nuevo León), 
ultimately convening local Task Forces as grassroots units to perform the work 
needed. Having state authorities involved in deciding how to allocate funds and 
working to raise additional funds themselves provided a whole new dimension 
to the program and gave meaning to the promise of making the Border 2012 
program a “bottom-up” effort. 
The glaring weakness in the U.S.-Mexico environmental cooperation frame-
work has been the absence of a comprehensive natural resource management 
The glaring weakness in the 
U.S.-Mexico environmental 
cooperation framework has 
been the absence of a com-
prehensive natural resource 
management and conserva-
tion program.
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and conservation program. Since the La Paz Agreement, issues related to ur-
ban growth and cross-border pollution were given a unified formal outlet, while 
matters of conservation and natural resource management continue to be ad-
dressed through agency-to-agency dialogue. While there is no inherent reason 
to consider the interagency dialogue as deficient, having a bilateral program as 
a framework does provide a consensus mechanism for critical stakeholders to 
assess the state of the border on a given problem, and agree on the goals and 
the overall plan to accomplish objectives. 
The prevailing circumstances in the 1970s and 1980s leading up to the La Paz 
Agreement indicated the need to address uncontrolled pollution and health 
issues of grave concern all along the border.9 Population growth on the Mexi-
can side of the border increased dramatically during the 1960s, leading to many 
unincorporated settlements (colonias) on the periphery of urban areas with 
little or no infrastructure to manage their impact. The construction of water and 
sewer lines lagged behind the rate of population growth, given the migration 
to border areas generated by the employment boom of the Mexican govern-
ment’s Border Industrialization Program of the 1960s. In addition, hazardous 
waste began to appear unchecked in urban peripheries along the border,10 
reflecting the risks of having a highly industrialized nation in proximity to a devel-
oping nation with a lesser degree of institutional capacity. In that respect, the La 
Paz Agreement and the programs that followed were an admirable antidote for 
improving Mexico’s institutional capacity and infrastructure. 
Eleven years after the La Paz Agreement, with the signing of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Border Environment Cooperation Com-
mission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADBank) be-
came an additional mechanism for creating environmental infrastructure within 
the border region. Over the course of nearly three decades, the BECC-NAD-
Bank binomial, as of November 2012, had reviewed, certified and funded 34 
water distribution systems, 83 sewer collection systems, 41 new wastewater 
treatment plants and the upgrade or expansion of 15 existing plants, three 
water reuse systems, 16 landfills, 8.3 million square meters of paving, and 
was engaged in renewable energy projects. The majority of these actions were 
performed through the bilateral institutions, i.e., Border xxI/Border 2012/Border 
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2020 and the BECC-NADBank, and many received matching funds from the 
Mexican federal government and/or state governments. 
Since the early 1990s, Mexico has gradually developed a new level of institu-
tionalization, with state governments consolidating regulatory and enforcement 
branches. Still, both federal governments remain central to solving issues of 
water scarcity, wildlife habitat or endangered species because (a) there is no 
border-wide, regional program to deal with the joint management of natural 
resources, and (b) many of these issues remain under federal jurisdiction in 
Mexico, leaving any institutional arrangement up to a federally created frame-
work. On the U.S.-side, the Department of Interior (DOI), the agency in charge 
of natural resource management, pulled out of the U.S.-Mexico environmental 
program structure as Border xxI expired (2000). In its stead, DOI limited its 
collaboration with Mexico to the Border Field Coordinating Committee, a less 
collaborative effort created in 1994 composed of several DOI divisions11 and no 
Mexican representation. So, while Mexico’s SEMARNAT continues to handle 
matters of water supply (through the National Water Commission, CONAGUA) 
and conservation (through the National Commission for Protected Natural 
Areas, CONANP), the absence of DOI in the overall border framework leaves 
SEMARNAT without an equivalent counterpart. 
Factors defining the sustainability of the Border Area 
The border area is overwhelmed by demographics both from natural momen-
tum as well as migration, creating unplanned, unregulated, and unincorporated 
neighborhoods along the periphery of many cities. The rapid growth rate chal-
lenges not only infrastructure development but emergency preparedness and 
response capacity as cities continue to expand. As many of the new residents 
are younger, they perpetuate the faster growth of the region, especially in the 
cities. This evolution of the border region fosters production and consumption, 
as in all urban societies, and has created additional pressures on the natural 
resource base. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly difficult to supply the 
necessary services to the growing population in a planned fashion, one that 
would respect the desired vision of sustainability for the region.
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This means that even as valiant and successful efforts by both sides address 
the environmental impacts of decades past, new challenges will persist and 
even newer ones will emerge. It is estimated that between US$12 billion and 
US$20 billion of investment in environmental infrastructure will be needed over 
the next 20 years.12
Transborder Environmental Influences and their  
Impacts Assessments
The notification of environmental impacts of projects that transcend borders 
remains a seemingly perpetual example of how far apart the two nations and 
their states and counties/municipalities are on basic environmental principles. 
Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessments (TEIA) are important to 
initiate and facilitate the process of monitoring on both sides of the border, 
minimizing impact from one side to the other, mitigating where it is most 
cost-effective, and jointly managing the system.  In other words, TEIA enable 
the fundamentals of environmental stewardship to occur systemically. Several 
examples below illustrate their importance.
The first example is the lining of the All-American Canal that travels along the 
northern edge of the California-Baja California border. This water supply canal 
flows from the Colorado River west into the agricultural area in the Imperial Val-
ley. It was built in an era when such canals were earthen, allowing some seep-
age into the groundwater. This seepage maintained groundwater levels on both 
sides of the border, allowing farmers in the Mexicali Valley to continue to draw 
from their wells and for natural habitats to support endangered species. When 
the US side decided to line the canal with cement to save water (to transfer 
it to the thirsty populations on the coast), Mexico quickly realized there would 
be a groundwater supply and salinity issue.  Had the United States conducted 
and shared an extensive TEIA, it could have recognized and communicated the 
impact early enough in the process to arrange mutually beneficial, least-cost 
alternatives.
During the California energy crisis a private electricity provider recognized that 
building another power plant on the US side could not occur because of ambi-
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ent air quality standards would have been exceeded. It requested and received 
permission from Mexico to build the power plant in Mexico close enough to 
the border to export all of its electricity to the US. The natural gas for the plant 
was to be provided by a pipeline leading from the US side. In essence, pollu-
tion was exported to Mexico while the 
benefits accrued to the US. Had the 
United States side conducted a TEIA 
to consider the health effects when it 
was assessing the other impacts of 
the natural gas line, a collaborative en-
vironmental health-protecting solution 
could have been reached. 
The downsides of these mostly 
unilateral and in many cases federal 
actions can be minimized and mitigat-
ed through better flow of information 
across the border before projects are 
built.  The first step is for each juris-
diction to view itself not unilaterally 
but part of an inter-jurisdictional and in 
some cases international system. 
Energy, biodiversity, water, air quality 
and waste management stand out 
as the critical issue areas in border sustainability. A discussion of each of the 
issues follows.
Energy
The U.S.-Mexico border region has traditionally been seen as energy-poor, but 
developments in natural gas and renewable energy are quickly changing the 
scenario. The region has petroleum and natural gas reserves in east Texas, Tam-
aulipas, and parts of Nuevo León and Coahuila, with refineries dotting the border. 
Some of these refineries send cleaner fuels back to Mexico after receiving crude 
The downsides of these  
mostly unilateral and in many 
cases federal actions can 
be minimized and mitigated 
through better flow of  
information across the border 
before projects are built.   
The first step is for each  
jurisdiction to view itself not 
unilaterally but part of an  
inter-jurisdictional and in some 
cases international system.
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petroleum from Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEx) and other sources. However, nat-
ural gas and clean energy consumption is low in most states within the region, 
with liquefied petroleum gas and heavy oil providing the bulk of energy to all of 
the Mexican states. Only California and Texas show a higher degree of natural 
gas consumption (Figure 3), with very poor investment levels in renewable ener-
gy with the exception of Baja California and California (wind energy). 
According to the California Energy Commission, about 50% of natural gas con-
sumption for the year 2006 went to electricity generation in the state. Residen-
tial use of this resource took up only about 22%, from which almost 90% was 
used for space and water heating. California depends importantly on natural 
gas because it accounts for about a third of its energy requirements, although 
only 13.5% of its natural gas supply is in-state produced.13 
Figure 2. natural Gas Consumption per state (2009)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and Secretaría de Energía, Prospectivas del 
Mercado de Gas natural 2010-2025
By 2010, Texas consumed more than three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 
of which just a little over 3% goes to residential use. On the other hand, the 
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industrial sector and the electricity producing sectors were each using up to 
40% of the total natural gas consumed in the state.
For cost-effective operation and development of clean, sustainable energy 
anywhere in the world, it is necessary, or at least very helpful, to have the 
proper natural resources that can fuel such technologies. This is the case of the 
US-Mexico border region, where most of the territory of the 10 border states is 
rich in alternative energy potential. However, the region suffers poor transmis-
sion capacity and few interconnections between the two nations.   
As seen in figure 3, concentration of solar radiation in the Southwestern states 
of the US and in the Northwestern Mexican states is the highest within the 
two countries, especially in Arizona, Baja California, California, Chihuahua, 
Coahuila, Sonora and New Mexico, giving the region a privileged opportunity to 
produce energy from solar power technology. 
Figure 3. Annual direct normal solar Radiation in the  
Us-Mexico Border Region. 
Source: NREL (National Renewable Energy Laboratory), US Department of Energy, 2011.
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Figures 4 and 5 show winds speed intensity in both countries at a height of 
80 meters. The color scales on both maps are different, but nevertheless, it 
helps us visualize areas that are noticeably apt for wind power development. 
In the United States, the highest intensity area extends from the Dakotas in 
the north, all the way south to Texas and New Mexico. In Mexico, there are 
three important areas with high wind intensity, two of them in the northern 
border states. One of these areas covers most of the state of Tamaulipas and 
parts of the states of Nuevo León and Coahuila. The other area comprises the 
mountainous areas of Baja California, again giving the US-Mexico border region 
a strategic potential for the development of yet another sustainable energy 
source.
To date, only the states of Baja California and Tamaulipas in Mexico have 
developed projects for wind power generation, although the state of Nuevo 
León has already carried out a study to identify the state’s areas with high wind 
power potential, as described in the document Wind Energy Potential in Mexi-
co´s Northern Border States.14  Further benefits from the development of these 
types of energy would be the possible creation of clusters for manufacturing 
wind and solar power technologies in the region, creating jobs and using the 
region´s available human capital.
Differences between the U.S and Mexican regulatory systems for develop-
ment and distribution of electricity frustrate efforts by various policymakers to 
facilitate renewable energy development.  Recently the BECC and NADBank 
have become involved in such activities with promising results. Investment in 
the U.S is encouraged by tax credits and production, but the highly centralized 
nature of regulation in Mexico leaves few incentives for private developers.   
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Figure 4. Us Annual average wind speed at 80 m.
Figure 5. Mexico’s wind power density at 80 m. 
SENER (Secretaria de Energía). Prospectiva de Energías Renovables 2012-2026. México.
Source: NREL (National  
Renewable Energy Laboratory)  
of US Department of Energy.   
Wind maps 2012.
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Thus in order for the border region to reach its potential to develop and ex-
change renewable energy across the border, electrical transmission infrastruc-
ture needs to be built and meeting renewable portfolio standards must accom-
modate international exchanges. Especially encouraging is the use of interstate 
compacts to negotiate transborder renewable energy, environmental review, 
siting, finance and the creation of public-private partnerships to build transmis-
sion infrastructure.
Lastly, three mechanisms for improving the energy balance within the transbor-
der region have not fulfilled their potential. 
1. Methane-to-Markets. In 2004, the USEPA inaugurated a Meth-
ane-to-Markets Program, together with seven additional founding na-
tions. Mexico was one of the signatories to the agreement and remains 
interested in the concept given the value for capturing methane from 
coal-mine operations, landfills and agricultural operations. 
2. Energy service Companies (EsCos). The mechanism calls for a poten-
tial partner to provide an energy demand assessment of factories and 
other facilities and share the savings and the utilities with them. 
3. Renewable portfolio standards (RPs), which are target amounts or 
proportions of a state’s electrical demand that it seeks to meet with 
renewable energy. These exist in all U.S. states along the border, but the 
transborder mechanism to enable the RPS of a U.S. state to be met with 
projects in Mexico has not been activated.
Biodiversity
The border region is home to a number of unique biomes known as “natural 
hotspots” such as the California Floristic Province; the Chihuahua and Sonoran 
Deserts; the Madrean Archipelago (a series of mountain ranges and basins 
rising from the desert floor); southern Texas plains hills and dry forests; and 
the Western gulf coastal plain. This biological richness and diversity provides 
resilience and resistance to the border region as well as an immense range 
and depth of ecological services. These natural hotspots contain great diversity 
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of species of flora and fauna. For example, the Madrean Archipelago contains 
40% of the pine tree species of the world, about 30% of all the oak species 
known to date, and about 525 species of birds.15 These transborder ecosys-
tems are also important because they allow migrant species to traverse along 
a natural corridor that extends beyond the border between the two countries, 
which is necessary for hunting, mating and exchanging of genetic material 
for the well-being of their species. Ecosystems and species in the region are 
threatened by more common forms of pollution and destructive activities, but 
also by the fragmentation and destruction of the physical environment caused 
by the border wall.
Water 
Since 1906, the United States and Mexico have shared the management of 
their common water resources. Dividing the waters equitably was the more 
critical issue up until the 1960s, with the issue of water quality showing an 
increasing presence in bilateral negotiations and peaking around the 1980s. The 
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC, with U.S and Mexico 
sections), is the agency responsible for making the water policies of both na-
tions work properly at the border. While there are three binational watersheds 
(the Tijuana and Colorado rivers and the Río Grande) in the U.S.-Mexico border 
region, national policies on both sides dictate the water management regimes 
within them and beyond. Surface water is the only area where a bilateral 
agreement exists, as groundwater remains a taboo for binational talks; to make 
things even more challenging,the sharing of subsurface water data has not 
been reached yet. The reticence by both governments to engage in a discus-
sion on joint groundwater management is most evident in the Imperial-Mexicali 
valleys, where the All-American Canal incident of 2006 left several scars that 
neither federal government nor the State of California would care to touch. For 
U.S. entities, the concern appears to be the wetland habitat that has sprouted 
down-gradient from the agricultural fields in the Imperial Valley, within Mexican 
territory, due to the infiltration of irrigation water over decades. For Mexico, the 
concern is how to rein in private agricultural wells that are not fully regulated. 
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In any event, groundwater can be euphemistically deemed as an area of oppor-
tunity for both countries within joint water management. 
A spike in salinity in Colorado River water crossing into Mexico was cause for 
concern during the 1960s. Later on, in the 
1970s and 1980s, water pollution in the 
Tijuana River and the Ambos Nogales area 
also necessitated bilateral talks. The increas-
ingly urban nature of the U.S.-Mexico border 
region was probably the major reason why 
water pollution control and water and sewer 
infrastructure became the major topics of 
such bilateral institutions as the U.S.-Mexico 
environmental program and the Border Envi-
ronmental Cooperation Commission. Ac-
cording to Sanchez, over 97 percent of U.S. 
investment in the border programs prior to 
1998 was devoted to building up Mexico’s 
capacity to collect and treat its sewage, a 
clear indication of U.S. priorities prompted 
by cross-border pollution.16
With urbanization as a predominant trend in this arid region, interbasin trans-
fers of water are increasing. Energy intensity per acre-foot of water is also on 
the rise, and the water and energy nexus has become increasingly important. 
According to a study by Baja California’s Comisión Estatal de Energía (State 
Energy Commission), energy costs represent almost 40 percent of total ex-
penditures by all four state water utilities.17 In that respect, the connections of 
water and energy, similar to others, such as food and water, are just two of the 
examples of the intersection of human security with the environment. 
Water supply issues will persist as a challenge in that there is competition for 
surface waters and no agreement about how to use ground waters, even as a 
first-ever aquifer assessment of groundwater extent and quality is underway.  
Surface water is the only 
area where a bilater-
al agreement exists, as 
groundwater remains a 
taboo for binational talks; 
to make things even more 
challenging, the sharing of 
subsurface data has not 
been reached yet.
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As far as water quality, the greatest challenge is no longer point sources of 
pollution, such as a factory, but non-point sources, such as farms or urban 
runoff. The nexus between water quantity and water quality is water reuse: the 
treatment of wastewater to acceptable standards and devising ways of reusing 
the water within the urban context, as well as increasing efficiency in agricul-
tural areas to manage drainage for useful 
purposes.  The final desirable outcome is 
to approach watershed-level planning that 
can incorporate concerns from both sides 
of the border, integrating water efficiency, 
source protection, environmental flows 
for habitat enhancement, and transborder 
water markets. But this still remains an 
elusive vision.
Air Quality  
The border region, with few exceptions, 
consists of a series of common transbor-
der airsheds (volumes of air that circulate 
or exist temporarily on both sides of the 
border). Two factors in particular work to 
make air quality management at the border 
challenging: a rapid degree of sprawling urbanization and industrialization, 
and the division of legal jurisdiction between the two countries within those 
common transborder airsheds. Combine the above with the arid and semiar-
id nature of the region, the high automobile usage in the Southwestern U.S. 
coupled with the lack of public transit in Mexican cities, and the result is urban 
air quality that is in fact a mixture of carbon monoxide, suspended particulate 
matter (mostly PM 2.5, 6.0 and 10), and ozone. In a study on the levels of 
ozone, carbon monoxide and PM10 done for the San Diego-Tijuana and Mexica-
li-Imperial borders, Quintero et al found air quality compliance for PM10 only in 
San Diego, in Tijuana and San Diego for CO, and all four counties/municipalities 
were in non-attainment for air ozone quality standards.18
Two factors in particular 
work to make air quality 
management at the border 
challenging: a rapid degree 
of sprawling urbanization 
and industrialization, and 
the division of legal jurisdic-
tion between the two coun-
tries within those common 
transborder airsheds.
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Air quality is especially challenging when we include greenhouse gases. Air 
quality issues have always been complicated by their complex mixture of  
pollutants, sources, exposures, effects and the susceptibilities of different  
populations, and can be compounded in a binational context. What’s more, 
maritime flows introduce pollutants from bunker fuels (the relatively dirty  
petroleum product burned by ships at sea) and the remote rural and even the 
larger and closer community centers have no air quality information.
Brick kilns both in the Paso del Norte and the Mexicali-Calexico border are 
especially dirty sources of all pollutants. Traditional fuels for kilns include waste 
materials like scrap wood, tires, batteries, fuel oil, and almost anything that’s 
ignitable. The Mexicali-Calexico area has one of the highest incidences of 
asthma in both countries, and two additional power plants built by Intergen 
and Sempra Energy aggravated a community already susceptible to respiratory 
ailments. 
Congestion at ports of entry continues to be a source of air contamination as 
the average queue time has increased in the last 10 years. Some trucks wait in 
line for several hours.
Muñoz-Meléndez, Quintero-Núñez and Pumfrey provide several options to 
meet the challenges of air quality management at the border, amongst which 
the cross-border trading of emission-reduction credits and the creation of a 
clean-air investment fund stand out.19   
sources of Pollution and hazardous Materials
Socioeconomic differences and levels of industrialization bear the greatest in-
fluence of all in the generation of solid waste. The rich/poor dichotomy that has 
resided at the U.S.-Mexico border for decades was at the root of many of the 
hazardous waste findings in Mexican rural areas along the border in the 1980s 
and 1990s. As described by Sanchez, the “massive exportation of hazardous 
wastes from industrialized to developing countries” became “the easiest 
solution for transferring the externalities of their economic development”20 and 
was of grave concern in the U.S.-Mexico border, particularly in the days when 
the institutional capacity of Mexico was less developed. Figure 6 and Table 1, 
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in particular, show the degree of differences across the border in the levels of 
solid waste production in the US-Mexico Border States per capita in 2008 and 
total tonnage of solid waste generation from 2004 to 2011. 
Figure 6. solid waste per capita production (2008)
Source: SEMARNAT, Compendio de Estadísticas Ambientales, 2012 and EEC/BioCycle, State 
of Garbage in America Survey (2006, 2008, 2010)
Hazardous materials include both naturally occurring but human-concentrated 
elements as well as toxic and otherwise dangerous materials manufactured by 
humans. “Haztraks” was one of several examples of initiatives to track hazard-
ous materials as they flowed across the border; unfortunately, these initiatives 
have now ended. Residual and excessive fertilizers and pesticides drift away 
from farms and occasionally across borders. Therefore, the border program has 
an agricultural worker training program aimed at alleviating some of the threats 
from such drift especially to the families of those farmers. Furthermore, half 
the tires, which were a fire and disease-vector risk, have been removed from 
the once mountainous piles that existed. 
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Table 1. hazardous materials generation at the U.s.-Mexico 
Border. 
state
hazardous materials  
generation (tons)
% of state  
generation within 
national total  
generation.
 
Mx Us
  2004-2011 2005-2011*
Baja California 25,894   1.35
Coahuila 38,624   2.01
Chihuahua 342,650   17.84
Nuevo León 128,849   6.71
Sonora 15,148   0.79
Tamaulipas 146,993   7.65
National Total 1,920,408   100.00
% in Border States: 36.35    
Arizona   305,003 0.20
California   2,590,191 1.67
New Mexico   4,010,276 2.59
Texas   57,641,781 37.26
National Total   154,705,765 100.00
% in Border States:   41.72  
Source: SEMARNAT, Compendio de estadísticas ambientales 2012; US EPA, National Biennial 
RCRA Hazardous Waste Report. 
* The US has biannual information for this data, therefore we only include information for the 
years 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011
One of the provisions of NAFTA was that hazardous materials (hazmat)  
originating in the U.S. should be repatriated back to the U.S. after use in Mex-
ico since the capacity to store, process and dispose was limited there.  The 
EPA set up a hazmat tracking system after the Southwest Consortium for 
Environmental Research and Policy reported that only single digit percentages 
were tracked by those researchers.  The funding for the program ended before 
the enforcement could be implemented. As a result massive amounts of lead 
batteries are exported across the border to Mexico  
to avoid U.S. regulations.21 
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The United States EPA database shows that of the 2,153 maquiladoras produc-
ing hazardous waste in 1992, only 329 industries have records of shipments to 
the U.S. This means that only 15% of maquiladoras have actually transported 
waste to the U.S.22
Measures of Progress
As we have mentioned throughout this report, there is a lack of hard data that 
can accurately describe the most important phenomena within the transborder 
region. The existence of such information would offer a great deal of help to 
regional decision makers. Over the course of Border 2012, the longest running 
U.S.-Mexico environmental program, a couple of efforts were made to create 
a series of indicators to monitor the programs progress.  A Border Indicators 
Task Force was formed to formulate the State of the Border Region Indicators 
Report 2005 23  and a second report in 201024 which contained a rundown of 
achievements and progress made on each of the seven goals that were part of 
the Border 2012 Program.
The Transborder Development Index, which is a product of the Transborder 
Information System (being built by the Border Research Partnership) is divided 
into four strategic areas, including sustainability, which is also divided into four 
dimensions, each one of them with their own subdivisions.
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sustainability subindex
dimension Indicator
Clean environmental conditions
-Management of wastes and clean-up of 
dumps
-Transportation pollution
-Water sanitation 
-Paving coverage in urban areas
Protection of natural resources
-Water consumtion
-Preservation of wild areas
-Population density in urban areas
-Pressure on water resources
Economic development and 
institutions
-Water industry efficiency
-Energy industry efficiency
-Environmental consultancy services
-Emergency management
Habitability (parks, recreation and 
diversity)
-Sewer coverage
-Water coverage
-Per capita parks and recreation area
-Infant mortality
Conclusion: Future Challenges to sustainability
The discussion throughout this piece provides what we believe to be a prudent 
prescription for addressing the region’s sustainability challenges. Below we 
briefly review some of the most important ones.
1. It is imperative that both nations come to grips with the importance 
of the region’s sustainability as part of their quest to promote our joint 
competitiveness and security. While the three are considered to be indi-
visible, the policies set forth by the federal governments do not reflect an 
equal standing for the three objectives. Moreover, environmental protec-
tion continues to be conceived of as a gracious concession or a goodwill 
action, instead of approaching environmental enhancement as an integral 
part of promoting regional security and prosperity.  
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2. In that regard, programs and policies aimed at improving sustainability, 
particularly those of the state and local governments, need to become 
more visionary and holistic and less reactive. True to its vision, or that 
expressed by decision makers while compiling the Strategic Guide-
lines document in 2009, water conservation must be applied as part of 
an overall strategy to reduce dependency and energy intensity due to 
imported water and to provide for environmental flows for ecosystem en-
hancement. States and municipalities must also strengthen their ability 
to monitor and enforce environmental compliance. 
4. State and federal environmental agencies cannot afford to remain silent 
about the foreseeable impacts the border wall will have on sensitive eco-
systems and endangered species. Security measures currently in place 
will become very costly unless counterweighed by proactive policies to 
mitigate environmental impacts. 
5. Bilateral water agreements between the U.S. and Mexico are turning 
a corner. At the closing of this publication, both countries had signed 
Minute 319, the most recent amendment to the 1944 International Water 
Treaty which incorporates common water markets, mechanisms for 
water exchanges and the creation of environmental flows for the Colo-
rado River. The agreement comes as evidence continues to accumulate 
regarding the future of water supply in North America in the face of 
increasing global warming and climate variability.
6. The stakeholders within the U.S.-Mexico transborder area have so far 
failed to act on the region’s enormous potential for generating renewable 
energy. The level of science, economic development and complementary 
features that the juxtaposition of these two nations provide, together 
with the wealth of solar incidence in deserts and desert-based cities can 
make it a world leader in solar and other renewable energy development. 
The region can ill-afford to pass up this “natural mandate” if it is to seri-
ously seek world class competitiveness and sustainability. 
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CONCLUSION
Andrew selee
 
Millions of Mexicans and Americans live in the U.S.-Mexico transborder region, 
but the importance of this region to the economies of both countries goes 
far beyond its size and population.  Not only has the border region become an 
area of joint economic production for the two countries, but billions of dollars 
of goods pass through it, connecting the two countries in one of the densest 
and most vibrant corridors for their economic fortunes.  Christopher Wilson has 
found that approximately six million U.S. jobs depend on trade with Mexico, 
and these are not only in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California, but also 
in Michigan, Nebraska, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, New Hampshire, Tennessee, 
and almost every state in the union.1  The economic impact is even greater for 
Mexico.
The security challenges that the two countries face are also disproportionately 
concentrated in this region.  Over the past decade Mexico has seen a rise in or-
ganized crime violence as criminal groups have fought over access to the bor-
der region as a way of moving illegal narcotics north, and bringing their profits 
from sales to U.S. consumers, along with sophisticated weapons and ammu-
nition, back across the border to Mexico.  While violence has actually dropped 
slightly in U.S. border communities over the past decade,2 U.S. policymakers 
have recognized a shared responsibility for the security situation in Mexico and 
worried about how to protect the shared border against threats from use by 
terrorist groups in other parts of the world.3 
Finally, border communities themselves share unique challenges to manage 
natural resources since ecosystems that cross international boundaries without 
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regards to legal jurisdiction require joint problem-solving. Quality of life issues 
from healthcare to education to culture also often extend beyond the formal 
boundaries that separate the two countries.  How the two countries address 
these issues – whether managing water, addressing pollution or educating the 
next generation of border residents – has enormous impacts in both countries 
far beyond the border region itself.
The border itself is extremely 
diverse, as Francisco Lara notes, 
and even the definition of the 
border region is subject to multiple 
definitions.  For practical purposes, 
the border is far more than just 
the communities that lie along the 
international boundary, but rather 
the geographic area that is linked 
though supply chains, transborder 
tourism, trade, and dense family 
networks.  In many ways, Los An-
geles, San Antonio, and Monterrey, 
for example, are as much part of the 
border region as many cities and 
towns that lie on the border itself.  
These communities vary greatly in 
economic development, cultural heritage, and regional histories.  On the face 
of it, there appears to be little similar between San Diego, California and Doug-
las, Arizona or Tijuana, Baja California and Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila.  
Yet the international line that divides Mexico and the United States does 
impose some common characteristics and, even more importantly, common 
challenges, on border cities.  The greatest of these challenges is how to match 
the inherent creativity and problem-solving ability of local communities that 
deal with each other day-in and day-out as part of larger regional systems with 
the reality of an international border which imposes different legal systems, in-
The greatest of these challenges 
is how to match the inherent cre-
ativity and problem-solving ability 
of local communities that deal 
with each other day-in and day-out 
as part of larger regional systems 
with the reality of an international 
border which imposes different 
legal systems, institutions, and 
laws, and which requires that 
much regional decision-making be 
filtered through Washington, DC 
and Mexico City.  
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stitutions, and laws, and which requires that much regional decision-making be 
filtered through Washington, DC and Mexico City.  This report details both the 
difficulties and the opportunities available to border communities as they deal 
with this duality, and it proposes a series of ways forward that we believe can 
improve the future of both countries.  In many cases, border residents them-
selves are leading the way on solving local problems,4 but the international 
nature of the border requires that policymakers in the capitals of both countries 
support and facilitate these efforts.
One of the most important challenges is how to get the greatest economic 
benefit for both countries from the border region so that it both improves living 
standards in the region and serves as a spark for the economies as a whole be-
tween the two countries.  Erik Lee and Christopher Wilson find that even mod-
est investments in border infrastructure and creative efforts to manage points 
of entry more efficiently can produce substantial economic gains to both the 
border region and to the national economies in both countries.  Current efforts 
to develop master plans for infrastructure investment in four sectors along the 
border, following the successful effort between California and Baja California, 
are a good starting place, and can lead to synergies between local, state, and 
federal authorities and between the private and public sectors.  Investments 
in several ports of entry to date have been extremely helpful, although many 
of these projects are still underway, 
and there have been a few creative 
public/private ventures that suggest 
that there may be new ways of har-
nessing synergies between econom-
ic interests and the public good to 
improve border infrastructure.
Some of the most exciting possibil-
ities to improve crossing times at 
the border and stimulate economic 
exchange may lie in creative ap-
proaches to risk management, which 
One of the most important 
challenges is how to get the 
greatest economic benefit for both 
countries from the border region 
so that it both improves living 
standards in the region and serves 
as a spark for the economies as a 
whole between the two countries. 
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can also help improve security at the border.  The expansion of trusted traveler 
programs for both cars and trucks has helped to segment flows that are more 
risky from those that are less so and can be controlled through background 
reviews and spot checks.  Using new technologies, it may now be possible to 
move towards pre-inspection in some border ports, clearing shipments before 
they reach the border and tracking them on the way there, so as to decon-
gest ports of entry themselves.  While most of the attention in the United 
States (and, to a lesser extent, in Mexico) has been on investments in staffing 
between ports of entry,  there is good reason to believe that greater attention 
to the ports themselves makes far more sense both for security concerns (see 
below) and to spur the economies in both countries.
Security cooperation remains another very tangible challenge for border com-
munities.  From the optic of the communities themselves, this challenge is 
about promoting public security, dealing with violent crime and property crime, 
and, especially on the Mexican side, professionalizing the police, prosecutors, 
and courts.  From the vantage point of those outside the border, the challenge 
is about restricting the operations of organized crime groups that use the bor-
der to traffic illegal narcotics, guns, and money and engage in human traffick-
ing, as well as other extra-hemispheric groups that might take advantage of 
these existing smuggling routes to commit terrorist acts.
Both the local public security challenges that communities face and the broad-
er national security concerns about organized crime are interlinked and require 
new forms of cross-border cooperation.  The sharing of intelligence between 
the national governments in Mexico and the United States on the move-
ments of criminal organizations has led to several high profile arrests and the 
fragmentation of some groups, and day-to-day cooperation among front-line 
police officers and prosecutors in border states is also increasing in tandem 
with national efforts.  These interactions sometimes take place through official 
channels, which have improved over time, and led to the placement of U.S. and 
Mexican agents in fusion centers in each other’s country.  Yet they also take 
place through informal relationships that allow police and prosecutors to share 
information quickly without going through the often lengthy formal channels of 
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international notification that run through the capital cities.  This is particularly 
true between municipal and state law enforcement agencies that have devel-
oped their own informal protocols and networks for passing sensitive informa-
tion in a timely way to prevent and solve crimes.
Eric Olson and Erik Lee argue that not only do the two countries need great-
er collaboration at the border, but they also might think of moving some law 
enforcement efforts away from the border itself.  While border inspections 
provide a basic deterrent effect for smuggling, there are relatively few seizures 
at the border of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines, which represent 
the overwhelming profit source of organized crime groups, or illegal money 
and weapons going south, which provide the lifeblood of the criminal groups.5  
These valuable commodities are 
trafficked primarily through ports of 
entry, where there has been com-
paratively less investment in staffing, 
technology, and risk segmentation, 
while major infrastructure and 
personnel investments have been 
made in controlling the expanses 
between the ports, which are used 
primarily for immigrant smuggling 
and marijuana trafficking.  However, 
future efforts to slow the flow of 
hard drugs, weapons, or bulk cash 
should not focus exclusively on the 
border itself.  Rather, it is investment 
in border ports combined with intelli-
gence-based efforts away from the border that allow law enforcement agen-
cies to discover and dismantle the trafficking operations at their origin.
On the Mexican side of the border, the renewal of criminal justice institutions 
remains one of the major challenges.  There have been some positive develop-
ments in Chihuahua, Baja California, and Nuevo León on judicial reform, which 
Future efforts to slow the flow of 
hard drugs, weapons, or bulk cash 
should not focus exclusively on the 
border itself.  Rather, it is invest-
ment in border ports combined 
with intelligence-based efforts 
away from the border that allow 
law enforcement agencies to dis-
cover and dismantle the trafficking 
operations at their origin. 
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should make the courts more transparent and efficient and lead to changes 
in policing and prosecution efforts.  However, these efforts are still at an early 
stage.  There have also been noticeable investments in reforming police bodies 
in these states that appear to have yielded results.  Crime is down in each of 
these states as of this writing,6 and especially in Baja California and Chihuahua. 
These institutional changes, 
while still insufficient, may 
have something to do with 
the progress in lowering 
crime rates.  Better coopera-
tion between federal, state, 
and local authorities, and 
shared intelligence across the 
border, have also played a sig-
nificant role in containing the 
violence.  Cross-border efforts 
to professionalize the criminal 
justice system—from police 
in the streets to prosecutors, 
judges, and prisons—remains 
a large area of opportunity 
for cooperation and mutual 
learning.
Managing natural resources 
provides yet another set of 
challenges for cross-border cooperation.  The recent agreements between 
the two national governments to jointly manage the Big Bend area (2011) and 
to update binational management of the Colorado River watershed (2012) are 
landmark efforts to develop collaborative management strategies for shared 
natural resources.  Efforts to date to manage water have also been far more 
institutionalized than other parts of the relationship, and the existence of the 
North American Development Bank (NADBank) and Border Environmental 
Cooperation Commission (BECC) provides technical expertise and real funding 
Efforts to date to manage water 
have also been far more institu-
tionalized than other parts of the 
relationship, and the existence of 
the North American Development 
Bank (NADBank) and Border  
Environmental Cooperation  
Commission (BECC) provides 
technical expertise and real  
funding that can be invested in 
improving border communities’ 
environmental management.  
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that can be invested in improving border communities’ environmental man-
agement.  However, as Rick Van Schoik and Carlos de la Parra note, there is 
an urgent need to build on these existing efforts and to promote new ways of 
managing scarce resources.  Some of the challenges, such as water conserva-
tion, also require unilateral measures in each country to change practices.
One major opportunity in the border region is the development of renewable 
energy sources which can benefit communities on both sides of the border.  
Several Mexican municipalities are well-placed to produce wind and solar en-
ergy and perhaps even biofuels, which could both help lower electricity prices 
in Mexico and help meet new standards in some U.S. states for including re-
newable sources in electricity generation.  To date, however, these efforts have 
been stymied by the lack of integration of the electrical grid and by regulatory 
issues that limit cross-border transmission.7
Finally, border communities face numerous challenges -- and real opportunities 
-- for improving quality of life.  These include everything from improving the 
quality of education to building effective healthcare systems to promoting a 
vibrant cultural life.  Though it lies beyond the scope of this report, it is worth 
noting that the border region is the site of innumerable experiments in creative 
ways of bridging the divide between countries to solve problems and improve 
the quality of life on both sides of the border.  Living near an international 
boundary often creates problems in addressing these day-to-day issues, by 
making it harder to have consistent responses in communities that lie next to 
each other across the line, but it also creates opportunities for creative cooper-
ation and cross-fertilization.  In two earlier works we have detailed some of the 
most exciting and innovative efforts at collaboration in these areas that have 
been taking place, and they remain an inspiration and a lesson in how the two 
countries can work together more effectively. 8
Many of the challenges that border communities face are no different than 
what others in their respective countries deal with: how to improve policing, 
protect the environment, and generate innovation and growth.  The border, 
however, imposes limitations and creates a need for cooperative thinking on 
many of these issues.  Bringing together stakeholders from the border with 
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the federal governments of both countries is essential to improving the region’s 
future, and many of the benefits will undoubtedly also accrue to Mexicans and 
Americans far beyond the border region.  A more efficient border holds the 
promise of helping spur economic growth and create jobs in both countries 
both in the border region and far beyond.  Improved public security, diminished 
criminal activity, and more secure flows across the border will enhance the 
well-being of citizens throughout both countries.  And a wise management 
of natural resources will help us preserve the planet for the generations that 
come.  These are challenges that border residents from the United States  
and Mexico must face together, but also that all citizens in our two countries 
must-face together.
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ThE noRTh AMERICAn CEnTER FoR TRAns-
BoRdER sTUdIEs
 The North American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona State University 
is a university-based public policy analysis and advisory group that collaborates 
with key partners to improve North American cooperation and prosperity.
 our Vision
The North American Center for Transborder Studies works to promote a safer, 
more prosperous, more competitive, more cooperative, and more sustainable 
North American region.
 
nACTs And ARIzonA sTATE UnIVERsITy
Arizona State University currently enrolls approximately 70,000 undergraduate, 
graduate, and professional students on four campuses. ASU has a vision to be 
a New American University, promoting excellence in its research and among its 
students and faculty, increasing access to its educational resources and work-
ing with communities to positively impact social and economic development. 
The North American Center for Transborder Studies strives to embody in all 
of its initiatives the New American University priorities of global engagement, 
social embeddedness and societal transformation.
 
nACTs CAPACITy
NACTS has a trinational Board of Advisors; an ASU University Advisory Coun-
cil; partner universities and organizations throughout Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States; a Management Committee of high-level ASU administrators; 
and a small professional staff. 
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EL CoLEGIo dE LA FRonTERA noRTE
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To study and divulge the significance of regional issues occurring in the 
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to the development of the region and the country
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der, political, urban and environmental issues occurring in the United 
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To foster the highest academic standards and intellectual rigor, among 
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To turn these studies into tools that can be used in planning and policy 
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Casa Colef, in Mexico City.
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